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INCORPORATING WEATHER AND CLIMATE DATA INTO 
INTEGRATED CROP MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
by 
Steven E. Hollinger1 
INTRODUCTION 
Agricultural technology has greatly increased the productivity of American agriculture 
during the past several decades. The higher yields and larger production are a result of 
better hybrids and varieties, larger application of fertilizers, and better pest control using 
chemical pesticides. The larger applications of fertilizers and pesticides have resulted in a 
threat to our environment. This threat was due to an attitude of "if a little is good, more 
is better." An increasing awareness of environmental concerns by producers and the general 
public has resulted in the agricultural community reevaluating our recent production 
practices, and the creation of the Low Input Sustainable Agriculture (LISA) program. 
Regardless, whether a producer's philosophy is LISA or high input agriculture, the main 
concern is whether he/she is making a profit. 
Agricultural research has determined which production practices will result in good 
production over many years. However, it has not addressed the issue of year-to-year 
variations in production. Granted, our agricultural extension personnel and production 
managers are concerned with the year-to-year variations; however, the mountains of multi-
year experiments have not been examined for how weather has impacted the various 
experiments or recommended production practices. This has been left to the "art of 
production," where a producer learns how weather impacts production during the actual 
process. Such an approach in times of narrow profit margins results in unnecessary 
economic losses. Therefore, it is necessary to develop procedures to determine how a 
producer can use climate and weather information in timing production practices for 
optimum efficiency. 
Climate and weather information can be useful only in light of the complete crop 
system. The crop system includes the weather, soil and water conditions, crops grown, weeds 
and insects present, physical and economic resources available, and the management 
expertise of the producer. Weather, the continuing daily changes in the atmospheric 
conditions, impacts each of the other pieces of the system. For example, it is the pattern 
of rainfall that determines the natural soil moisture available to the crop, and whether the 
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producer must apply additional water through irrigation. Weather also impacts the rate of 
crop and weed growth and development. Many insects that are crop pests migrate into one 
region from another. It is the weather patterns and wind directions that determine the time 
of arrival and extent of emigration of these insects. Weather conditions determine the 
survival rate and rate of development of those insects that do not migrate. 
One might argue that a producer must have a 100% accurate picture of what these 
conditions were going to be throughout the growing season before the weather information 
would be of any value. A recent study by Sonka et al. (1986; 1987) demonstrated that even 
inaccurate climate and weather forecasts can be valuable to production agriculture. They 
concluded that climate and/or weather forecasts will have value to agricultural producers 
only if producers are able to 1) make a management decision based on the information, and 
2) carry out the actions required by that decision. Thus, the forecast must be made early 
enough for the producer to complete the operation before the event occurs. The actual 
value of the climate or weather forecast is dependent upon the value of the crop, the 
potential yield loss (gain) as a result of the management decision and operation, and the cost 
of the particular decision and operation. 
This paper will explore some methods that may be used to incorporate climate and 
weather information into agricultural production practices. Included are suggestions as to 
how climate and weather information may be used to form strategic and/or tactical plans to 
improve agricultural production efficiency. Strategic planning refers to long-range plans such 
as equipment purchases, manpower needs, and expansion plans. Tactical planning refers to 
seasonal and/or day-to-day operational plans. 
CLIMATE AND WEATHER INFORMATION NEEDS 
The weather variables important to agricultural production are: solar radiation, 
temperature (air and soil), relative humidity, wind, and precipitation. Evaporation is also 
important, but it can be computed using solar radiation, air temperature, relative humidity, 
and wind. Solar radiation is important since it is the ultimate driving force behind weather 
and the photosynthesis process. Rainfed or dry land agriculture relies entirely on 
precipitation for crop water. Just looking at precipitation does not give the entire picture, 
as the crop gets its water through roots from the water stored in the soil. Therefore, soil 
water might be included as a "weather" variable. 
The above variables can be defined in terms of weather variables and climate 
variables. Generally, weather is defined as the current state of the atmosphere. In practice, 
it is used to refer to the recent past (up to one year), the present, and the near future (6 to 
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10 days). The term climate or climatology is the long-term average of the past weather 
record. Climate terms include the daily, weekly, and monthly averages; standard deviations; 
and probability of occurrences of the various weather events. These can include the average 
and standard deviation over a given period of the current year, or of a given period over 
several years. Normally, climate variables are developed over a period of 30 years with new 
"normals" calculated every 10 years at the start of a new decade. 
Climate Information Development 
Climate information can be divided into two classes: 1) raw data, and 2) derived 
data. Raw data consists of the normally measured variables such as temperature, 
precipitation, relative humidity, wind, solar radiation, soil moisture, and potential 
evapotranspiration. Derived data consists of computed values such as growing degree days, 
heat stress days, cold stress days, temperature humidity index, and heating and cooling 
degree days. Since most cooperative weather stations only measure daily maximum and 
minimum temperatures and precipitation, some of the potentially measured variables (i.e., 
evaporation, soil moisture) may be derived or estimated using various models. 
The most common climatological data are the monthly means of maximum and 
minimum temperatures and total precipitation (Fig. 1). These data are too coarse for 
agricultural purposes. Weekly means, standard deviations, and probabilities are more useful 
since they allow the assessment of weather during critical crop growth stages. A problem 
with weekly data is that when the data are started on January 1 of each year, the actual days 
in the week change after February during leap years. For example, during a non-leap year, 
the 7-day period that includes the last few days of February and the first few days of March 
includes the days February 26 through March 4. In a leap year, this same week includes the 
days February 26 through March 3. To get around this problem, the climatological week has 
been defined. A "climatological year" begins on March 1 through March 7. The only 
problem this causes is that the last week of February is a "long week," 8 days in non-leap 
years, and 9 days in leap years. For most crops, this does not pose a problem. Table 1 gives 
the starting date of each climatological week during the year. 
1981-89 Air Temperature 1981-89 Mean Precipitation 
Champaign, Illinois Champaign, Illinois 
Figure 1. Example of 30-year climatological week means of temperature and precipitation for Champaign-
Urbana, Illinois. 
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Table 1. Starting date of each climatological week 
Week No. Date Week No. Date 
1 Mar. 1 27 Aug. 30 
2 Mar. 8 28 Sep. 6 
3 Mar. 15 29 Sep. 13 
4 Mar. 22 30 Sep. 20 
5 Mar. 29 31 Sep. 27 
6 Apr. 5 32 Oct. 4 
7 Apr. 12 33 Oct. 11 
8 Apr. 19 34 Oct. 18 
9 Apr. 26 35 Oct. 25 
10 May 3 36 Nov. 1 
11 May 10 37 Nov. 8 
12 May 17 38 Nov. 15 
13 May 24 39 Nov. 22 
14 May 31 40 Nov. 29 
15 Jun. 7 41 Dec. 6 
16 Jun. 14 42 Dec. 13 
17 Jun. 21 43 Dec. 20 
18 Jun. 28 44 Dec. 27 
19 Jul. 5 45 Jan. 3 
20 Jul. 12 46 Jan. 10 
21 Jul. 19 47 Jan. 17 
22 Jul. 26 48 Jan. 24 
23 Aug. 2 49 Jan. 31 
24 Aug. 9 50 Feb. 7 
25 Aug. 16 51 Feb. 14 
26 Aug. 23 52 Feb. 21 
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A discussion of how the various climate statistics are developed is beyond the scope 
of this paper. Two texts that deal with the development of climate statistics are Panofsky 
and Brier (1968), and Haan (1977). 
Use of Climate and Weather Information 
For the purposes of this discussion, we will refer to weather information as the 
current state of the environment, 24- to 48-hour, 3- to 5-day, and 6- to 10-day weather 
forecasts. Generally, forecasters today can demonstrate reasonable skill in the 24- to 48-
hour forecasts with decreasing skill as forecasts are extended out to 10 days. Unfortunately, 
it is these longer-range forecasts that are needed in the tactical planning of an agricultural 
production operation. Also, as the forecasts are extended further into the future, the 
forecasts are couched in more general terms such as "temperature 6 to 10 ° above normal 
with above normal to much above normal precipitation." Therefore, to make good use of 
the longer-range forecasts, one must know what the "normal" temperature and precipitation 
is for the period. 
This is where climatology enters the tactical planning picture. As noted above, 
tactical planning can refer to the day-to-day or seasonal planning of an agricultural 
production operation. When used in the near term (day-to-day) planning, knowledge of the 
current pest, soil moisture, and weather conditions along with weather forecasts (24-48 hour, 
3-5 day, 6-10 day) are necessary. Some day-to-day operations that might make use of these 
data are the rescheduling of field tillage operations, scouting for insect or other pest 
problems, and the timing of fertilizer and chemical applications. Agricultural forecasts in 
the 24-48 hour period will often include expected maximum and minimum temperatures, 
precipitation amounts, cloudiness, and wind conditions. The 3-5 day forecasts include an 
expected maximum and minimum temperature range, and precipitation type and amount ex-
pressed as a difference from normal. The 6-10 day temperature forecasts are expressed as 
degrees deviation from normal. The 6-10 day precipitation forecasts are expressed as above 
(below) or much above (much below) normal. These forecasts can be interpreted only in 
conjunction with climate data. Therefore, the producer or some advisor to the producer 
must make the appropriate computations to make the data more useful. The 6-10 day 
forecasts usually do not include any information relative to cloudiness or wind conditions. 
Tactical seasonal planning will help provide a game plan for hybrid/variety selection, 
alternative crop selection, and fertilizer and pesticide programs. In general, a basic plan for 
each of these items is a part of the strategic plan. However, by taking note of the current 
soil moisture conditions and long-range weather forecasts (30- and 90-day outlooks), and 
considering the normal climate, adjustments to this general plan can be made. For example, 
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if it is excessively wet during early spring and the 30-day forecast is for above normal rain, 
an estimated planting date can be determined using the work day climatology; current soil 
moisture conditions; normal rainfall adjusted for the wetter-than-normal forecast; and the 
time required to prepare the seed bed and plant the crop. Then "what if" questions can be 
asked to explore the options of hiring additional people and equipment, or changing 
hybrids/varieties based on the normal length of the growing season, and normal rate of crop 
growth and development. 
Strategic planning involves the identification of types and amounts of resources 
necessary to insure a profitable operation with the climate that occurs at a given location. 
Both climate and soil information are needed to determine the potential amount of water 
available to the crop, feasibility of irrigation, the average number of work days each season, 
and the length of the growing season. With these data the number and size of tractors and 
implements as well as the number of employees needed to accomplish each task in a timely 
manner can be determined as a function of the number of acres under production. The 
selection of major crops and alternative crops can be determined using the climate and soil 
data, along with environmental requirements of the different crops. Climate and weather 
information are also important components of soil and water management decisions. 
SOIL AND WATER MANAGEMENT 
Soil and water management is an important aspect of an agricultural production 
system. Soil management may be defined as caring for the soil to maintain fertility, preserve 
topsoil, and provide a media that plant roots can penetrate so the plant can obtain the water 
and nutrients needed for its growth. Water management, in simple terms, is managing the 
earth surface to get water into the soil, remove unwanted water from the soil, and control 
the loss of water from the soil by the processes of evaporation and transpiration. In the 
wetter regions of the world, water management involves removing excess water from the soil 
during and after rainy periods, and reducing evaporation and transpiration losses during dry 
periods. Drier regions of the world are normally concerned with preserving the water in the 
soil and adding additional water to the soil as needed by the crop. This is accomplished by 
some form of irrigation, usually from a limited supply of water. Therefore, water 
management in drier regions also involves irrigation scheduling. The discussion on soil and 
water management will be limited to dry land or rainfed conditions. 
Management of soil water has generally focused on controlling water lost from the 
soil by the process 'of evapotranspiration. Only minor attention has been given to the 
efficiency of getting water into the soil. Most studies of infiltration have been conducted as 
a part of research dealing with the water runoff and its associated soil erosion. The problem 
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of soil being carried off a slope by water is obvious. An additional problem that occurs 
when water runs off a slope before it can be absorbed by the soil is that the soil profile 
remains dry, and the productivity of that sloping land is decreased. 
Total water infiltration (Win) into the soil in inches, may be defined as 
where P is the rate of precipitation or water applied to the soil surface in inches/hours, If 
is the infiltration rate in inches/hour, t is the time the water remains on the surface in hours, 
and Woff is the water runoff in inches/hour. Equation 1 limits the amount of water entering 
the soil in one hour to the infiltration rate. Therefore, the total water entering the soil may 
be increased by increasing the infiltration rate, increasing the time the water remains on the 
surface, and/or decreasing the rate of precipitation or water application to a rate that is 
equal to or less than the infiltration rate. Man has not found a method of controlling the 
rate of natural rainfall; therefore, to increase total water entering the soil the infiltration rate 
and time the water is on the soil surface must be managed. 
The rate that water enters the soil surface is a function of the surface soil structure. 
Thus, any tillage operation or management practice that will increase the surface soil 
structure will speed up the infiltration rate. The major soil constituents that maintain soil 
structure are clay and organic matter content. Therefore, as organic matter and clay content 
(to a point) increase, the structure of the soil should improve. 
Tillage can be used to improve the infiltration rate when a crust has formed on the 
soil surface. A hard crust often forms after a heavy rainstorm due to the surface soil 
structure being broken down by the wetting of the soil clods and the energy of the raindrops. 
This crust results in emergence problems for young crops and a reduced infiltration rate at 
the start of the next storm. 
The second method of increasing total water infiltration is by increasing the time that 
water remains on the surface. This may be accomplished by leveling the land. Less 
expensive management techniques include maintaining residue on the soil surface, any other 
practice that decreases soil erosion such as maintaining plant growth or plant residue on the 
soil surface, or building terraces in the field. 
With plants growing in the soil, water will be naturally lost through plant 
transpiration. However, when plants are not growing, the producer should reduce as much 
soil evaporative loss as possible. This is best done by maintaining a cover of residue on the 
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surface. Tillage tends to dry the soil out, by pulling moist soil to the surface and burying dry 
surface soil. When this happens, the soil layer from the surface to the depth of tillage tends 
to dry out. This suggests that by minimizing tillage and maintaining residue on the surface, 
producers can reduce evaporative losses from the soil. 
However, when a residue cover is maintained on the soil surface, the soil will take 
longer to warm up in the spring than without a cover. Therefore, a producer must weigh 
the benefits of maintaining soil moisture against allowing the soil to warm up in the spring. 
It should be noted that dry soils will warm up faster than wet soils. Thus, during a dry spell, 
the decision may be made to maintain the soil cover to increase the total water infiltration 
into the soil and sacrifice soil warming in the spring. Conversely, during a wet spell, the best 
management practice may be to reduce residue cover as much as sound soil conservation 
practices allow, so that soils which tend to be excessively wet will dry out. 
There are also situations where the water table is so close to the surface that the 
major problem in most years is too much water rather than not enough. Under these 
conditions, the soil surface layer remains very wet until late in the spring, and planting is 
delayed. In these situations the water must be carefully removed from the soil. This is 
normally accomplished by placing a drainage network below the soil surface at an 
approximate depth of 40 inches. In some instances where water also stands in basins for 
more than a day, "stand pipes" are installed in the low areas to drain the surface ponds into 
the drainage system. 
In addition to the tendency for slow drainage of water from the soil surface, the need 
for drainage can be determined using a time series of soil moisture data similar to that 
presented in figure 2. The time series shows the average annual soil moisture throughout 
the year. The upper line in each soil layer is the water held by the soil at saturation, and 
the bottom line is the water held at the wilting point. Notice that in the 42- to 50-inch layer, 
the soil moisture is near saturation during the spring of the year. This soil is naturally poorly 
drained soil and the site is drained by field tile. If the field were not drained by field tile, 
layers above the 42- to 50-inch layer would be saturated during the spring. 
Crop Water Requirements 
In regions where natural rainfall is limited and water supplies are scarce, the need 
to understand the water requirements of the crop is obvious. This information may also be 
used in more moist sub-humid areas to plan rainfed cropping systems to evaluate the effects 
of water shortages on the crop. This process requires a knowledge of the total water 
normally available to the plant and the crop water requirements. 
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Figure 2. Average soil moisture changes through the year at Champaign, Illinois. 
Determining Plant Available Water. The total water available to the plant during a 
given season is the sum of the water available in the soil at planting, and the water entering 
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the soil from natural rainfall or irrigation. The total amount of water stored in the soil that 
is potentially available to the crop is a function of the soil water holding capacity and the 
root depth. 
The soil water holding capacity is a function of soil texture and structure. Water is 
held in the soil against the forces of gravity and root uptake by a natural attraction of the 
soil colloids to water and the capillary action of pore spaces. The percent of pore space 
in a volume of soil is dependent upon the bulk density of the soil, and in practice is 
computed from a determination of bulk density by 
where pb and ps are, respectively, the bulk and particle densities of the soil. From equation 
2 it can be seen that as the bulk density decreases, the pore space increases. Therefore, as 
bulk density decreases a larger portion of the soil volume is comprised of pore spaces. If 
the bulk density becomes too low, a large number of macro-pores will comprise the soil 
volume, and even though the soil profile will contain more water at saturation, this water will 
not be available to the crop since it will drain through the soil profile and out of the root 
zone. Hence, there should be some "optimum" soil bulk density for each crop defined by 
the ability of the plant roots to penetrate the soil and the potential maximum amount of 
water available to the plant in the root zone. 
When the soil pore space is completely filled with water, the soil is said to be 
saturated. Unless the water table is at the soil surface, the soil will remain saturated for only 
short periods of time, because gravity will pull water down to the deeper regions of the soil 
profile. 
The soil is said to reach "field capacity" after it has drained from a state of saturation 
for 24 hours. Field capacity is used loosely here since there is no good definition of field 
capacity that applies universally for all soils and soil conditions. The major use of field 
capacity is to define an upper limit on the water potentially available to the plant in the soil 
profile. The water between "field capacity" and saturation is normally not available to the 
plant since it is removed from the root zone before the plant can use it. 
The lower limit to plant available water is called the wilting point. At this point the 
soil colloids hold the water with a tension greater than the tension a plant can apply to 
remove the water from the soil. The difference between the "field capacity" and the wilting 
point is called the plant available water, or potentially plant available water, and is expressed 
as inches of water per inch of soil (in/in). 
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To determine the total amount of soil water available to the plant at the start of the 
season, the effective root zone must be known. The maximum potential plant available 
water (Wtot) can be computed by 
Wtot = Wppav • Dr (3) 
where Wppav is the potential plant available water in (in/in) and Dr is the effective root 
depth. 
In practice the computation of the available water in the root zone requires (1) an 
estimate of the plant available water in each of the different soil layers, expressed as a 
percent of the potential plant available water; (2) the depth of the soil layers; and (3) the 
potential plant available water of each layer. The depth of each soil layer and the potential 
plant available water of each layer may be obtained from modern soil surveys. The percent 
of potential plant available water in each layer requires some type of measurement. This 
measurement may be obtained using gravimetric methods, gypsum blocks, tensiometers, 
neutron probes, or other suitable soil moisture measurement techniques. 
Crop Water Requirements. Since most cultivated crops are planted each year, the 
root zone varies from the planting depth to the effective soil root zone or the maximum 
depth of the normal root growth for the crop, whichever is more restricting. Therefore, the 
root growth habits of the crop must be known, along with the amount of water needed as 
a function of crop growth stage. 
To plan a water management plan for a given situation, the time of each crop growth 
stage must be estimated. A simple and commonly used method of doing this is counting the 
number of days after planting. However, for most crops the greatest water demand and the 
most critical stages for water are during flowering and early grain set. Using the number of 
days since planting or emergence results in large errors in the time of these critical stages. 
(The discussion in this paper is restricted to the grain crops of corn, soybean, sorghum, and 
wheat.) The errors are due to the differences in temperature from year-to-year. 
The development of most crops is dependent upon the temperature experienced and 
the photoperiod, if the crop is photoperiod sensitive. Therefore, with crops that are only 
temperature sensitive, a better method of predicting crop development is the computation 
and accumulation of "growing degree units." The general equation for computing growing 
degree units (Gu) is 
Gu = [Tmx + Tmn)/2] - Tb (4) 
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where Tmx and Tmn are the maximum and minimum daily temperatures, respectively, and Tb 
is a base temperature. If Gu is less than 0, Gu is set equal to 0. This prevents the 
accumulation of negative Gu's, which would imply a reversal of crop development, an 
impossible condition. 
The base temperature of wheat is 40° F, and the base temperature of corn and 
sorghum is 50°F. The base temperature is the temperature below which crop development 
is assumed to stop. For many crops there is a maximum temperature above which the rate 
of crop development is reduced. Therefore, a modified growing degree unit (Gmu) has been 
devised that is used for the warm season crops of corn and sorghum. The computation of 
Gmu is the same as equation 4 with the exception that if Tmn is less than 50 ° F, Tmn is set to 
50°F, and if Tmx is greater than 86°F, Tmx is set equal to 86°F. Tables 2, 3, and 4 present 
the growth stages along with the corresponding root depths, daily water use requirements, 
and the relative growing degree units required to reach each stage. Relative growing degree 
units are the ratio of the growing degree units necessary to reach a given growth stage, and 
the growing degree units necessary for the crop to reach maturity. 
The soybean varieties grown in the central United States are very photoperiod 
sensitive. To estimate the start of flowering, a photoperiod function must be used. There 
are various soybean phenology models in the literature (Hodges and French, 1985; Jones 
and Laing, 1978; Wang, et al., 1987) that include both growing degree units and photoperiod 
in estimating soybean development. 
For this paper and the growth stage determination used in Table 5, the procedure 
used by Wang et al. (1987) has been adapted to estimate development as number of days 
after planting. The data in Table 5 represent approximate days after planting at a latitude 
of 40° north. The approximate days for different latitudes may be determined by computing 
the photoperiod at the longest day of the year (June 21 in the northern hemisphere) using 
where D1 is the day length in hours, 5 is the solar declination on the longest day of the year 
(23.45 °), and is the latitude. The number of days from planting to maturity (Dpm), and 
planting to flowering (Dfl) are computed by 
where a and b are the coefficients given in Table 6 for soybean groups II, IV, and V. 
Following the sequence of soybean stage development described in How a Soybean 
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Develops (Iowa State University, Special Report No. 53), it is assumed that 5 days elapse 
between each vegetative stage up to V5. The relative time span between reproductive stages 
is computed as the ratio of the length of the reproductive period computed by 
where Dri is the days from stage R1 to stage Ri (i = 1 to 8), and Di is the days from R1 to 
stage Ri given in the How a Soybean Develops and reproduced in Table 5. 
Table 2. Corn growth stages, relative growing degree units to each stage, 
estimated rooting depth, and estimated water use during each growth stage. 









Planting 0.00 2.00 0.06 
2-Leaf 8.00 5.00 0.08 
4-Leaf 14.00 6.00 0.11 
6-Leaf 17.00 8.00 0.13 
8-Leaf 23.00 12.00 0.15 
10-Leaf 32.00 16.00 0.18 
12-Leaf 38.00 20.00 0.20 
14-Leaf 43.00 24.00 0.23 
Silk 50.00 36.00 0.30 
Anthesis 52.00 38.00 0.30 
Blister 62.00 40.00 0.27 
Dough 72.00 42.00 0.25 
Early Dent 81.00 42.00 0.15 
Full Dent 91.00 42.00 0.10 
Mature 100.00 48.00 0.07 
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Table 3. Sorghum growth stages, relative growing degree units to each stage, 
estimated rooting depth, and estimated water use during each growth stage. 









Planting 0.00 2.00 0.06 
3-Leaf 10.00 6.00 0.07 
5-Leaf 22.00 10.00 0.09 
Panicle In 33.00 15.00 0.13 
Final Leaf 44.00 30.00 0.18 
Boot 55.00 36.00 0.23 
50% Bloom 66.00 42.00 0.28 
Soft Dough 78.00 46.00 0.25 
Hard Dough 89.00 48.00 0.18 
Mature 100.00 48.00 0.12 
Table 4. Wheat growth stages, relative growing degree units to each stage, 
estimated rooting depth, and estimated water use during each growth stage. 









Init SprG 0.00 6.00 0.01 
Leaf Elong 7.00 12.00 0.03 
Joint 19.00 18.00 0.16 
Boot 30.00 24.00 0.22 
Head 42.00 36.00 0.27 
Flower 53.00 36.00 0.32 
Grain Fill 65.00 36.00 0.35 
Dough 77.00 36.00 0.32 
Ripening 88.00 36.00 0.20 
Mature 100.00 42.00 0.05 
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Table 5. Soybean growth stages, relative growing degree units to 
each stage, estimated rooting depth, and estimated water use 
during each growth stage. 
(Adapted from Aceves-Navarro, 1987; Teare and Peet, 1983.) 
Growth 
Stage 





(in/day) Group III Group IV Group V 
Planting 0 0 0 2.00 0.05 
V1 10 10 10 4.00 0.06 
V3 18 19 24 10.00 0.08 
V5 26 27 38 15.00 0.11 
R1 34 35 52 20.00 0.14 
R4 53 56 73 25.00 0.19 
R5 61 64 81 30.00 0.25 
R6 73 78 95 30.00 0.31 
R7 88 94 110 30.00 0.32 
Mature 97 103 120 30.00 0.23 
Table 6. Coefficients for computing the days required for soybeans to 
go from planting to maturity (Dpm) and from planting to flowering (Dfl). 
Soybean Coefficients 
Maturity Group Planting to Flowering Planting to Maturity 
a b a b 
III 26 2.8 83 5.1 
IV 26 3.3 87 5.6 
V 25 9.7 97 8.3 
15 
Table 7. Range of heat units from January 1 to a 
life stages. 
given European Corn Borer 
European Corn Borer Growth Stage Base 50 Heat Units 
First Generation 
Adult Emergence and Flight 432 to 911 
Eggs 650 to 1030 
First instar larvae 844 to 1122 
Second instar larvae 969 to 1247 
Third instar larvae 1139 to 1417 
Fourth instar larvae 1287 to 1567 
Fifth instar larvae 1417 to 1695 
Pupae 1520 to 1798 
Second Generation 
Adult Emergence 1620 to 1898 
Moth Flight and egg laying 1748 to 2513 
First instar larvae 1901 to 2636 
Second instar larvae 2021 to 2756 
Third instar larvae 2109 to 2844 
Fourth instar larvae 2210 to 2945 
Fifth instar larvae 2323 to 3058 
Examples of Climate and Weather Use in Agriculture 
Nitrogen Management. An increasing concern in rural communities is the rising 
levels of nitrates in the water supply. Additionally, the products of denitrification, specifically 
N2O, are contributors to greenhouse gases and thus a concern relative to global change. 
Therefore, any procedure that will improve the efficiency of nitrogen fertilization will 
preserve the environment and improve producers' profits. Weather plays an important role 
in the efficient use of nitrogen fertilizers. The important weather variables in this case are 
precipitation and temperature, specifically soil temperature. 
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Hollinger and Hoeft (1986) studied the response of corn to NH3 application as it was 
affected by weather. The expected relative yield (YE) of corn to additional increments of 
NH3 was defined by 
YE=α(N+1)β (8) 
where α is the relative yield if no NH3 is applied, and β is the increase in yield with each 
additional increment of NH3. α and β were found to be highly related to the ratio of the 
precipitation to evaporation between the periods of June 11 to July 5, the normal time of 
rapid corn growth at the location of the study. Equations 9 and 10 define α and β, 
respectively, 
α = 1.980 - 5.266 (P/E) + 4.231(P/E)2  (9) 
β = -0.422 + 1.987(P/E) - 1.621(P/E)2  (10) 
where P is the total precipitation, and E is the total pan evaporation from June 11 to July 
15. Figure 3 shows the relationship between P/E and α and β. The optimum P/E is 
approximately 0.6. Below 0.6 precipitation becomes limiting, and above 0.6 the soils are wet 
enough that nitrogen is lost through leaching of NO3 after nitrification and also through 
denitrification. 
Figure 3. Relationship between 
precipitation/evaporation and the 
relative maximum yield (a), and corn 
response to NH3. (Adapted from 
Hollinger and Hoeft, 1986).  
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Additional research by Hoeft et al. (1986), showed significant levels of NO3 nitrogen 
could be lost if the soil neared saturation several days following NO3 application. The loss 
was greatest on heavy silty clay loam soil with high organic matter content. Additional 
studies by Torbert (1989) indicate that this loss is due mainly to denitrification. 
The two studies mentioned above demonstrate that the use of climate and weather 
information in making nitrogen management decisions should improve the efficiency of 
nitrogen use. 
Insect Management. Many producers expend a considerable amount of time and 
money to control crop insect pests. The most common procedure for controlling pests is 
with applications of chemical pesticides. These chemicals are expensive and experience 
shows that in addition to being a hazard to the environment, as their use continues they 
become less and less effective. Therefore, procedures need to be developed that will reduce 
the need for insect treatments. Weather and climate information can be used to improve 
the timeliness and the effectiveness of a chemical application. This is especially true when 
the system approach is used where the crop susceptibility and insect development and 
population is considered. 
Figure 4 is a plot of the rate of modified base 50 growing degree unit (eq. 4) 
accumulation for corn, and the probable time of European Corn Borer (ECB) appearance 
based on the accumulation of heat units from January 1 (Table 7). 
Several methods have been proposed for computing heat units for insects. One 
approach is to duplicate the crop method (eq. 4). The other assumes a sine function as the 
temperature approaches the upper and lower temperature threshold. This approach 
attempts to account for the non-linear change in metabolic rates at temperature extremes. 
With the last method, if the minimum temperature is above the base temperature, 
the procedure is the same as the GDU50. If, however, the minimum temperature is below 
the base temperature, the mean daily temperature (TA) is computed as 
TA = (Tmx +Tmn)/2 •                 (11)
An angle is computed as 
where TB is the base temperature. Finally, the daily heat unit accumulation (HU) is 
computed by 
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The objective of figure 4 is to provide a method to determine if there is planting 
date-hybrid combination that will de-synchronize the time when the pest is present and the 
crop is susceptible to damage. If such a combination exists, the number of chemical 
treatments can be reduced. This is an example of strategic planning. 
As an example, the corn crop is most susceptible to ECB damage between the 10 leaf 
growth stage and early dent (Lynch, 1980). The typical ECB life cycle stages in figure 4 are 
the "normal" dates for Urbana, Illinois. From Table 2 the corn growth stages with relative 
growing degree days required to reach each stage can be obtained. To find the absolute 
growing degree days to reach a given stage, divide the value for the desired stage from Table 
3 by 100 and multiply by the growing degree units required by the selected hybrid to reach 
maturity. 
Since the rate of heat unit accumulation is different each year, the final tactical 
season plan is arrived at by observing the accumulation of heat units in a given season and 
then using the climatology of heat unit accumulation to "forecast" the likely time of ECB 
appearance. Once this is known, target planting dates can be looked at with different hybrid 
maturities to select the optimum hybrid for the season. 
Climate data may also be used to track insect development during a year. The 
procedure is to accumulate the insect heat units from the first of January until the present 
time; then, use climatology to project the probable date of the insect appearance. Such a 
procedure can assist in the day-to-day planning of when to begin scouting for a given insect. 
The procedure should not be used to determine when to treat for the insect. This can only 
be done after the field has been scouted and the insect population has been established and 
an estimate of probable damage to the crop has been made. 
Hybrid/Variety Selection. The example given for insect management is one case 
where weather may be used to select a hybrid. Other examples include selecting a planting 
date-hybrid combination that will reduce the risk of the crop being in a critical growth stage 
when there is a high probability of unfavorable weather (i.e., corn pollination during the 
hottest week of the year). Realistically, it is impossible to predict the hottest and/or driest 
week of the year. However, a study of the climate record provides the means of determining 
the risk involved for each week of the growing season. 
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Figure 4. Growing degree day accumulation from different dates of planting and the normal dates 
of different European Corn Borer stages at Urbana, Illinois. Degree day accumulations are computed 
from the 1901 to 1988 climate record. 
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Two examples could be discussed in this section 1) the probability of a heat stress 
during corn pollination, and 2) the probability of a water stress during corn pollination. We 
will discuss the first example here. 
Figure 5 is a plot of the normal growing degree day accumulations for different 
planting days, along with the frost and heat stress probabilities for each climatological week 
of the year. The planting dates begin the first week of April and end the week of the 15th 
of June. The frost probabilities are based on a 32 ° F temperature, and the probability of 
a heat stress is based on the maximum temperature exceeding 86°F during the week. 
Using the data in Table 2, the date of any growth stage can be estimated and the 
probability of a heat stress occurring during that period determined. For example, for a 
corn hybrid requiring 2700 GDU (Growing Degree Units) to reach maturity, silking occurs 
when 1350 GDU have accumulated from the date of planting. Assuming the planting date 
was on May 3, the crop is predicted to silk during the week of July 19 and mature during 
the week of September 20. There is a 49% chance of a maximum temperature greater than 
86 ° F occurring during the week of July 19; therefore, the crop is likely to experience at least 
a mild heat stress. The crop should mature before any frost occurs. If planting were 
delayed to the week of May 31, this hybrid would mature during the week of October 11 
with a 10% chance that frost would have occurred prior to the crop maturing. 
The above example indicates how figure 5 can be used to accomplish strategic and 
seasonal tactical planning. The results indicate the "normal" situation. However, each year 
will differ and actual growth stage dates will vary, depending upon the temperature during 
the year. 
SUMMARY 
Weather and climate play an important role in the success of modern-day agriculture. 
However, the general feeling is we cannot do anything about the weather. While we cannot 
change the weather and the long-term climate, we can use the climate and weather 
information to "weather proof production agriculture. Weather proofing agriculture 
requires a knowledge of the climate, the soils of the farm, the life cycles of the insects, and 
the environmental physiology of the crops that were being grown or might be grown in a 
given area. 
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Figure 5. Growing degree day accumulation from different dates of planting and the probability 
of a frost and/or a heat stress during each climatological week. 
Researchers and production consultants need to continue to search for the response 
of production agriculture to weather. This does not require establishing additional multi-year 
experiments since there is a wealth of this type of experimental data. The existing data 
should be reexamined to determine what weather factors contributed to the year-to-year 
variation in the data. Diligent attention to this year-to-year variability and the associated 
weather will help create the next "green revolution." This revolution will not come from the 
fields of biotechnology or genetic engineering, but from the optimization of current 
production practices as they are affected by the weather of an area. The methods presented 
above serve as an introduction to the use of weather and climate information to help analyze 
a particular operation and improve production efficiency. 
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A MID-SEASON CLIMATOLOGY OF JET CONDENSATION TRAILS 
FROM HIGH RESOLUTION SATELLITE DATA 
by 
James Q. DeGrand,1 Andrew M. Carleton,1 and Peter J. Lamb2 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent investigations of cloud cover over North America document an upward trend 
in cloud amount (Angell and Korshover, 1984; Changnon, 1981; Henderson-Sellers, 1989) 
and a decrease in the number of cloudless days (Seaver and Lee, 1987). The difference in 
the magnitude of the changes in cloudiness and sunshine suggests that the cloud increase 
may be due to thin cirrus (Angell and Korshover, 1984). There is speculation that these 
changes are due, at least in part, to anthropogenerated clouds in the form of jet 
condensation trails (contrails). The potential for contrails to influence climate has been 
much debated. The reason for the continuing uncertainty is, first, the influence of cirrus 
clouds, particularly thin cirrus (e.g., contrails) on the earth's radiation budget is not yet well 
understood (Liou, 1986). Second, while there have been several studies of the incidence of 
contrails (Detwiler and Pratt, 1984; Changnon et al., 1980; Wendland and Semonin, 1982), 
contrail climatologies covering extensive geographic areas and having high temporal 
resolution have not yet been produced, thus precluding the inyestigation of the climatic 
effect of contrails. Carleton and Lamb (1986) showed the feasibility of using Defense 
Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) imagery to derive such a climatology. They 
concluded that the DMSP imagery was well suited for an investigation of contrails due to 
its high spatial (0.6 km) and temporal (potentially 4 times daily) resolution. We here present 
some preliminary results from an investigation of contrail formation over that part of North 
America and the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans from 20° to 60° north, and from 65° and 150° 
west (here called the study area), based on DMSP imagery. 
DATA AND ANALYSIS 
Visible and infrared images from the polar-orbiting DMSP satellites archived at the 
World Data Center A for Glaciology (Snow and Ice), Boulder, Colorado, were used to 
1Climate and Meteorology Program, Department of Geography, Indiana University, 
Bloomington, IN 47405. 
2Illinois State Water Survey, Champaign, Illinois 61820. 
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identify contrails over the study area. Direct read-out images from Patrick Air Force Base 
(Florida) and San Diego Naval Base (California) provided coverage over the entire study 
area and were analyzed for mid-season months (January, April, July, and October) for three 
years (1977-79). There were no data for January, 1977. This time period was chosen 
because data from both stations were abundant relative to earlier and later periods. The 
high spatial resolution (0.6 km) of this imagery was capable of resolving features on scales 
typical of the more persistent contrails. The infrared imagery allowed for distinctions to be 
made between low and high cloud. 
Contrails were identified as linear, bright (i.e., high), generally short features often 
having orientations different from the surrounding clouds (Carleton and Lamb, 1986). Each 
contrail was geolocated in reference to a 1° x 1° grid covering the study area. The 
frequency of contrails over the study area was determined for each gridcell for each mid-
season month and for each of four six-hour time periods (00-06 GMT; 06-12 GMT; 12-18 
GMT; 18-00 GMT). 
DISCUSSION 
The spatial distribution of monthly mean contrail frequencies (Fig. 1) indicates that 
contrail formation is widespread over the United States and southern Canada. However, 
the distribution is not uniform. Areas in which contrails formed frequently are the U.S. 
Midwest and Southwest, and western British Columbia. The area north of Los Angeles 
seems particularly favored for contrail formation. The raw frequencies are low considering 
the volume of air traffic over the study area and the number of contrails that have been 
observed from the ground (Wendland and Semonin, 1982). These low frequencies are due 
in part to the stringent criteria used in identifying contrails (see above). This method 
effectively precludes the identification of contrails which have been significantly altered in 
shape by upper level winds. Higher frequencies would likely be observed using the 
methodology outlined by Lee (1989), which identifies contrails based on brightness 
temperature differences in the AVHRR infrared split window. The lack of data in the 18-00 
GMT time period during which air traffic is heavy (afternoon on the East Coast, mid-day 
on the West Coast) also reduces the total number of contrails identified. 
Some of the variability in raw contrail frequencies is due to variations in the number 
and areal coverage of the imagery from the two stations. The effect of these variations on 
contrail frequencies is estimated by fitting the following model: 
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Table 1 summarizes the results of the regression analysis. The variability of the departures 
of the observed from the expected contrail frequencies may be considered to be 
representative of the combined effects of variations in air traffic in the upper troposphere 
and changing meteorological conditions. The distribution of the departures from expected 
frequencies for each gridcell did not differ significantly from the distribution of the raw 
frequencies shown in Figure 1. The relative absence of contrails in the areas known to have 
high volumes of air traffic (e.g., the Northeast U.S.) and the high frequencies over areas with 
lower volumes of air traffic (e.g., the Northwest U.S.) indicate that meteorological conditions 
play a critical role in determining the seasonal and geographic distributions of contrails. It 
would be possible to fully decouple the effects of air traffic and meteorological conditions 
given a dataset of the number of air carrier flights between North American cities on a 
monthly (or shorter) basis. At this time however, we have been unable to locate such a 
dataset. 
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Table 1. Ordinary least squares results for regression 
number and area of images analyzed. 
of contrails on 
Parameter Estimate Student's 
t-statistic 
probability > |t| 
by chance 
b0 -132.218 -3.41 0.0016 
b1 5.542 9.95 0.0001 
b2 1.732 2.95 0.0056 
Assuming that there are no profound changes in air traffic from season to season, the 
mean seasonal departures form expected contrail frequencies represent the seasonal 
departures from expected contrail frequencies represent the seasonal variation in contrail 
formation due to changing meteorological conditions. Table 2 summarizes these departures. 
They indicate that the fall and summer are, respectively, the seasons having the largest and 
smallest number of contrails. This seasonal variability is likely to be associated with changes 
in tropopause height, temperature, lapse rate and mixing ratio, and is the subject of 
continuing research using the contrails database. 
Table 2. Monthly mean departures from expected 
frequencies (Obs - Exp). 
Jan Apr Jul Oct 
3.892 -0.000 -23.504 20.910 
The diurnal variation in contrail frequency was determined by calculating mean 
departures from the predicted frequencies for each of four 6-hour time periods (Table 3). 
The diurnal variability of the departures from expected contrail frequencies indicates that 
contrails form most frequently during the 1800-0000 GMT time period, and least frequently 
during the 0600-1200 GMT time period. Since there is little diurnal variability in upper 
tropospheric temperature and relative humidity, it is reasonable to associate the diurnal 
contrail variability with variation in air traffic. This is supported by the fact that the 1800-
0000 (0600-1200) time period corresponds to periods with air traffic is likely to be heavy 
(light) over the study region. 
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Table 3. Mean departures (Obs - Exp) for four 6-hour time periods. 
00-06 06-12 12-18 18-00 
27.955 -44.019 -7.472 23.537 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study demonstrates that contrails are a widespread phenomenon over North 
America, particularly over the U.S. While the geographic distribution of contrails is broadly 
similar to published generalizations of air traffic over the U.S. (U.S. Geological Survey, 
1970), there are significant departures from this pattern in some regions. There is also a 
seasonal variation in contrail formation. Ongoing research seeks to establish the 
meteorological conditions which give rise to these spatial and temporal variations. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This research was partially supported by NOAA Grant COMM-NA89RAH09086 and 
NOAA Grant NA87AA-D-CP119. 
REFERENCES 
Carleton, A.M., and P.J. Lamb, 1986: Jet contrails and cirrus cloud: A feasibility study 
employing high-resolution satellite imagery. Bull. Amer. Meteor. Soc., 67, 301-309. 
Changnon, S.A., 1981: Midwestern cloud, sunshine, and temperature trends since 1901: 
Possible evidence of jet contrail effects. J. Appl. Meteor., 20, 496-508. 
Changnon, S.A., R.G. Semonin, and W.M. Wendland, 1980: Effects of Contrail Cirrus on 
Surface Weather Conditions in the Midwest. Phase I. Final Report for NSF Grant 
ATM 78-09568. Illinois State Water Survey, Champaign, 141 pp. 
Detwiler, A., and R. Pratt, 1984: Clear-air seeding: Opportunities and strategies. J.  
Wea. Mod., 16 46-60. 
29 
Henderson-Sellers, A., 1989: North American Total Cloud Amount Variations this 
Century. Palaeogeog., Palaeoclim., Palaeoeco., (Global and Planetary Change 
Section), 75, 175-194. 
Lee, T.F., 1989: Jet contrail identification using the AVHRR infrared split window. J.  
Appl. Meteor.. 28, 993-995. 
Liou, K.N., 1986: Influences of cirrus clouds on weather and climate processes: A global 
perspective. Mon. Wea. Rev., 114. 1167-1199. 
Seaver, W.L., and J.E. Lee, 1987: A statistical examination of sky cover changes in the 
contiguous United States. J. Clim. Appl. Meteor., 26, 88-95. 
U.S. Geological Survey, 1970: National Atlas of the United States, Government Printing 
Office, 417 pp. 
Wendland, W.M. and R. G. Semonin, 1982: Effect of Contrail Cirrus on Surface Weather 
Conditions in the Midwest - Phase II. Final Report for NSF Grant ATM 80-08812, 
Illinois State Water Survey, Champaign, 95 pp. 
30 
IMPACTS AND SOME LESSONS TAUGHT BY THE 1988 DROUGHT1 
by 
Stanley A. Changnon, Jr.2 
ABSTRACT 
One of the worst droughts of the 20th Century peaked in the contiguous United 
States during 1988. Its impacts were pervasive, affecting agriculture, water resources, 
transportation, recreation, and wildlife. Costs and losses amount to nearly $40 billion, 
making it the worst natural hazard of this Century. Governmental responses were typically 
made in a crisis mode, reflecting poor preparation and lack of planning. The drought 
impacts and responses suggest several actions are needed at the federal level to address 
future droughts including a standing interagency task force, updated water management 
plans, development of drought contingency plans where none exist, and improvements in the 
system for predicting, detecting, and monitoring drought at the local, regional, and national 
scales. 
INTRODUCTION 
The physical, social and economic impacts of the drought, which started in 1987 and 
reached a peak severity in the summer of 1988, were ubiquitous, pervasive, and will 
reverberate through the U.S. environment and economy for some time to come. The 
drought pointedly reminded scientists, the public, and policymakers how sensitive 
environmental and socio-economic systems are to a simple hazard: lack of normal rainfall 
and above normal temperatures. Major impacts occurred in agriculture, water resources, 
transportation, recreation/tourism, wildlife and other elements of the country's environmental 
and economic infrastructure, though, of course, losses in some areas were balanced by gains 
in others. 
The President's Interagency Drought Policy Committee (1988) estimated that the total 
drought losses in agriculture alone during the last three-quarters of 1988 were $13 billion of 
direct GNP. Second- and third-quarter GNP growth was reduced to 0.9% and 0.6%, 
respectively, due mostly to reduced agricultural production. This increased retail food prices 
1From Planning for Water Shortages, U.S. Commission on Irrigation and Drainage, 1989. 
2Principal Scientist and Chief Emeritus, Illinois State Water Survey, Champaign, Illinois 
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in the U.S. by 0.5%. In combination with impacts on energy, water, ecosystems, and other 
aspects of the economy, the drought cost the U.S. roughly $40 billion, making it the most 
costly natural disaster ever to affect the nation. 
IMPACTS 
Because of the great extent and intensity of the drought, all aspects of our 
environment and society were affected. The greatest economic loss was in agriculture, where 
more than $15 billion in crop losses occurred. There were 20 to 50% reductions in corn, 
soybean, and spring wheat production. The high value specialty crops of the east and west 
coasts were also detrimentally affected: Maryland experienced $300 million losses to high 
value crops. The full dimension of the impacts on agriculture will never be fully assessed, 
though we know of impacts on seed development, continuing effects on the livestock 
industry, and a slow trailing off of effects on the consumer due to food price increases. Crop 
prices soared in 1988, but major grain surpluses accumulated from prior years saved the 
nation from any form of shortages in 1988-89. 
The summer 1988 heat wave was extensive with summer temperatures rated as the 
highest on record over 13% of the nation, including the major metropolitan areas of the 
Midwest and Northeast. The result was an estimated 5,000 to 10,000 deaths related to heat 
stress (Avery, 1988), though the wide range of this estimate testifies to how poorly this 
critical effect is monitored. 
The environment was notably affected with major reductions in water supplies and 
diminished water quality in streams and wetlands. Forest fire damage in the West was the 
greatest on record, and the populations of certain species of wildlife in the Mississippi River 
Basin were reduced from 5 to 30%. The environmental effects will be the most long-lasting 
of all the effects of the drought of 1988; and there are few, if any, winners from the 
environmental losses. 
Transportation was also uniquely affected by the drought in the central United States. 
Rapidly falling river levels in the Mississippi River Basin led to stoppages of barge traffic in 
June and July, with 50% reductions in barge shipments throughout the summer. This caused 
shipping disruptions and price increases for the shipment of bulk commodities such as coal, 
grains, and petroleum products. 
The drought in the central U.S. was sufficiently short-lived that effects on urban-
industrial water supplies in the Midwest were mostly minor. However, it was the second 
year of a growing water supply drought in the Pacific Northwest, and the fourth year of a 
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continuing drought in the southeastern U.S.; both areas experienced serious water supply 
problems. 
A fifth major area of effect was to the government operations. Local, state, and 
federal government agencies were affected by the need for added services, and requests for 
funds and for technical assistance. Governmental responses included the $4 billion in 
drought relief to relieve the most serious losses to farmers and, in turn, to agribusiness, plus 
$3 billion in insurance payments. Governments also dealt with a myriad of drought-induced 
controversies including those relating to the management of forest fires in the West, and the 
proposed diversion of waters from the Great Lakes to enhance flow of the Mississippi River. 
As in all droughts, there were economic "winners." The drought did not embrace 
the entire nation and farmers growing grain and specialty crops in non-drought areas (the 
Deep South, southern Great Plains, and the Southwest) achieved higher profits as prices 
rose. Railroads in the Midwest recorded major profits due to the diversion of shipments 
from the river systems. In the water supply area, well drillers received much more demand 
for their service as rural and small urban water system managers came to realize how 
vulnerable they were. However, though one cannot estimate with any confidence the 
proportion of the $39 billion total losses that were compensated, the winnings are believed 
to be small relative to the losses. 
Types of Impacts 
The values (dollar and otherwise) presented here are estimates and are not derived 
from in-depth economic or environmental analyses. One must recognize that in many 
instances, these values are imprecise and subject to errors of unknown sizes. 
The drought effects were pervasive and had some form of influence on all U.S. 
citizens by the end of 1988. In some instances the influences were large, such as among 
Midwestern and northern Great Plains farmers, and in others they were small, especially on 
people whose livelihood is not closely associated with natural resources supply. Regardless, 
the drought broadly affected elements of everyday life such as food prices, which touched 
everyone from school children to elderly retired persons living in places where the drought 
did not occur. 
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Table 1 itemizes many of the drought impacts identified, illustrating the wide diversity 
of its effects. The sectors most impacted were agriculture, human health, and the 
environment. Agriculture was especially impacted because the intensity and areal extent of 
the drought was greatest during the growing season of most primary crops, May-August. 
Table 1. Roster of Drought Impacts 
A. Environmental 
1. Wildlife - reduced populations, food loss for migration 
2. Insects - populations greatly changed, some increased 
3. Forests - major losses; fires, growth stunted, delayed death 
4. Ornamentals - worse than realized to trees and bushes, delayed death 
5. Fish - major losses in low streams, and poor quality 
6. Soil - increased wind erosion 
7. Water - quality very poor, unable to handle industrial discharges and agricultural 
pollution 
B. Human Health (physical and mental) 
1. Deaths - number of persons totally or partially attributed to heat is in thousands 
2. Illness - asthma, heat stress, etc. 
3. Emotional problems - anxiety over heat stress, loss of income, higher costs for cooling 
and ornamental treatments, loss of recreational opportunities, 
concern over climate change 
C. Agriculture 
1. Surpluses reduced 
2. Prices up for corn, soybeans, and wheat 
3. National vs. regional impacts varied 
4. Fanners in drought areas hurt, those elsewhere helped economically 
5. Long-term impacts difficult to assess due to subsidies for exports and production 
6. Showed inability to accurately estimate magnitude of losses during drought 
7. Means to adjust to continuing drought available 
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8. Commercial forestry and inland fisheries hurt 
9. Increased crop insects and enhanced spraying 
D. Transportation 
1. Rivers - barge traffic hurt 
2. Railroads - enhanced 
3. Great Lakes - shipping increased 
4. Airlines - fewer weather delays 
E. Power Generation 
1. Record consumption of electrical power 
2. Hydropower generation reduced, costly fossil fuel required 
3. Brownouts, damaged electrical equipment, discomfort to humans 
4. Increased income to power companies 
F. Commerce and Industry 
1. Rain insurance hoax 
2. All-weather peril insurance overwhelmed 
3. Recreation industry - hurt, less revenue 
4. Construction - fewer delays 
5.. Shippers - higher costs 
G. Urban Areas 
1. Reduced water supplies 
2. Deaths of elderly citizens due to heat 
3. Inexperience in dealing with drought and choosing of proper responses 
4. Increased water consumption 
5. Developed conservation procedures and penalities 
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Water Resources 
1. Low streamflows 
2. Lowered Great Lakes, reservoirs, and farm ponds 
3. Lowered groundwater levels 
4. New sources developed - wells drilled, piping for diversions 
5. Increased public awareness of water value and need for conservation 
6. Increased costs for water and sewage treatment 
7. Interstate conflict heightened 
Education 
1. School hours reduced by heat 
Government Issues -
1. Conflicts between states, especially over water 
2. Establishment of drought task forces 
3. Increased services and costs to government: river channeling, fire fighting, 
payments, etc. 
relief 
4. Concern over CO2 as cause of drought 
5. Effect on election and efforts of new Administration 
6. Need for national attention and planning for future droughts 
7. New legislation for drought relief 
Table 2 itemizes some of the sectors and activities that benefitted from the drought. 
The role of countervailing benefits is best illustrated in agriculture. The USDA estimated 
that the net agricultural income in the U.S. in 1988 would be $57 billion, almost exactly the 
total income received in 1987. This fact, despite crop losses of about $15 billion, reflects 
three general factors. First, producers of specialty crop, corn, soybeans, wheat, and cotton 
in areas that escaped the drought (portions of the South, southern Great Plains, and 
Southwest) had average to above average yields. With increased prices, they experienced 
major income gains. Second, some farmers, and most grain companies in the drought areas, 
sold surpluses acquired from 1987 and 1986 at 1988's higher prices, helping to ameliorate 
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their physical crop losses. Farmers with irrigation in drought regions also were able to 
sustain high yields and were also beneficiaries of increased commodity prices. 
. Table 2. Roster of Winners from Drought Conditions 
1. Agricultural producers in non-drought areas and those with large surplus 
stocks 
2. Railroads 
3. Water-producing technologies (well drillers, weather modification 
companies, evaporation suppressants) 
4. Electric utilities (increased power sales) 
5. Coal companies (increased sales from greater use of coal at coal-fired 
utilities) 
6. Great Lakes ports (+15% increase in shipping) 
7. Construction Industry (increased profits due to fewer rain stoppages) 
8. Commercial Aviation (increased profits with fewer weather delays) 
Railroads in the Midwest benefitted because of the reduced shipment of bulk 
commodity goods on the Mississippi River system. Low flows from June through the fall of 
1988 reduced barge shipment by 50%, producing an increase of barge prices, with the net 
result of increased shipments of coal, petroleum products, and grains on the railroads of the 
central United States. 
The estimated additional income of the railroads in this area was $200 million. 
Those dealing in "water technologies" were also beneficiaries. This included well 
drillers, companies providing weather modification services, and companies providing 
chemicals for evaporation suppression. 
The electrical utility sector experienced general income increases due to the record 
high temperatures during July-August, which increased sales of power for air conditioning. 
Coal-fired utilities realized further profits as the generation of hydroelectric power was 
reduced by low river flows, and hydroelectric-based utilities were forced to purchase power 
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from the coal-based utilities. This led to another winner, the coal companies, which had 
increased sales. 
Another beneficiary was the Great Lakes ports and shippers. The diversion of grain 
and commodities export grain shipments to the railroads led to increased movement of these 
grains through Great Lakes ports with the corresponding decrease in shipping from Gulf 
ports. In general, all weather events of consequence produce winners as well as losers, but 
the net effect of an event like the drought is likely to be negative, given the physical 
damages and transaction costs of alternatives. 
RESPONSE TYPE PROBLEMS AND LESSONS LEARNED 
Analysis of the drought impacts revealed a series of major problems relating to 
reactions and responses. The first of these related to the slow detection of the drought 
with inadequate monitoring until it was well defined, and poor interpretation of the 
drought severity. The second problem area was related to the lack of information as to 
management options available to decisionmakers. In the agricultural sector there was 
confusion over the use of agricultural relief versus crop insurance to deal with 
agricultural losses. Another noted response problem related to scientific information 
about the drought. Differing pronouncements about the seriousness of the drought and 
its causes, including the potential that the drought was due to the Greenhouse Effect, led 
to confusion in decisionmaking. A fifth response problem noted was that even when 
information about the severity of the drought was available, many agencies and industries 
reacted extremely slowly. This apparently relates to a lack of experience and no 
available contingency plans. Considering the extent of public anxiety in drought areas, 
and the high loss of life due to the heat wave, there was an amazingly little government 
attention to the effects on humans. The lack of a standing or permanent interagency 
drought task force was obvious in reacting to the developing 1988 drought or the 
continuing drought into 1989. 
Given these response problems and the findings as to sizable impacts, what were 
some of the lessons learned from the drought, at least those that would help minimize 
future losses to drought? Several of these lessons relate to the federal government. 
Clearly, all federal agencies impacted by the drought (water and agriculture particularly), 
need contingency plans. Even for those with plans, particularly at the basin scale, need 
to be updated. 
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Models defining relationships between climate conditions and various functions or 
activities (crop yields, forest management, forest growth, etc.) need to be developed or if 
they exist, they need to be updated to deal with changing cultural conditions. The nation 
needs to establish a standing drought task force at the high levels. 
Improvements in drought monitoring and prediction are needed. Organizations 
with clear lines of responsibility need to monitor impending drought and to assess its 
status on regional and local scales. Research will be needed to improve drought-related 
predictions. 
A federal program is needed to deal effectively with the issue of protecting human 
life from heat-caused deaths. This involves education, provision of equipment, and a 
variety of other activities to aid the low income elderly from unnecessary death. 
Changes in federal policies are needed. These include the need to make new 
policy about how damaged agriculture is to be served, whether by crop insurance or by 
special relief funds. Agricultural policies relating to size of grain reserves and export 
policies must be redefined, as should policies relating to forest protection and fire 
management. In general, the ever growing population, coupled with diminishing 
resources means that the nation must have greater flexibility in its systems. 
SUMMARY 
Overall, national analysts saw the effects of the drought of 1988 as relatively minor 
in terms of the national economy. The Interagency Drought Committee's final report to 
the President concluded that there will be "little effect on the overall growth rate of the 
U.S. economy from the drought of 1988." When examined as GNP and Consumer Price 
Index effects, the national impacts do not seem significant. Nevertheless, the economic, 
environmental, and health impacts collectively make the drought of 1988 one of the 
nation's great natural disasters, and clearly it affected some regions and localities 
severely. It can be argued that several ameliorating factors, like surplus grain stores and 
federal monies earmarked for agricultural subsidies which could be changed to drought 
relief without impacting the budget, may not be as available during the next drought. 
Although the environmental damages of the drought of 1988 are less well known 
than others, they may well be the most sizable and long lasting effects of the drought. 
Economically, the agricultural sector was hardest hit: the nation lost 31% of its usual 
grain production, which could have precipitated a food supply crisis had there not been 
large surpluses from prior years. Human health impacts included an estimated 5,000 or 
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more deaths. 
The total economic losses and costs of the drought were roughly $39 billion, 
though we suspect that this is an underestimate, and that later accounting of enduring 
and cumulative effects will increase the loss figure. 
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AGRICULTURAL IMPACTS AND ADJUSTMENTS 
TO THE DROUGHT OF 1988-1989 
by 
Stanley A. Changnon, Jr.1 
INTRODUCTION 
The severe spring and summer 1988 dryness in the central United States, associated 
with a late summer heat wave, brought national attention to the "drought of 1988." In other 
areas such as California and the Pacific northwest, 1988 was the second year of drought, and 
in the southeastern United States, 1988 was the fifth year in an on-again-off-again drought 
situation that began in 1981. The Palmer Drought Severity Index at the end of July 1988 
is shown in figure la. Notable in the pattern of drought is that portions of the United 
States, including the deep south and the southwest, were not experiencing drought in 1988, 
nor had they in the prior several years. 
This report describes the known impacts and resulting adjustments to the continuing 
drought of 1988-89 (October 1988-June 1989). These impacts and adjustments can be 
thought of as two types: 1) those resulting from the drought conditions of 1988 in areas 
where the drought ended during the winter-spring of 1988-89, and 2) those effects and 
adjustments in areas which had either continued drought conditions into 1989 or had become 
drought-like during the winter, spring, and summer of 1989. The report begins with a 
description of the climatic aspects of the 1988-89 drought, and then impacts and adjustments 
to the 1988-1989 drought are presented according to major affected sectors: agriculture, 
transportation, water supplies, human health, and the environment. An updated assessment 
of the major losses from the 1988 drought conditions is also presented. 
This report has been prepared to further illustrate the types and magnitude of 
climatic impacts in the United States, and to analyze the resulting adjustments including 
policy actions and their implications for future U.S. policy. The report also focuses on the 
nation's effort to monitor the 1989 drought and to interpret its impacts, done as a basis for 
identifying actions needed to improve the monitoring and interpreting of drought conditions. 
This report has been prepared as the 1989 drought continues into the fall of 1989, and 
results are presented with the two cautions: first, at this mid-drought time, certain impacts 
are likely unknown or ill defined, and second, relatively early and often unverified 
1Principal Scientist and Chief Emeritus, Illinois State Water Survey, Champaign,m 
Illinois. 
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Figure 1. Areas of severe and extreme drought from mid-1988 to mid-1989 (Climate 
Analysis Center). 
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information about the reported impacts used may suffer from incorrect estimates of their 
true magnitude. 
This study has been made with climate data and information from three sources: the 
five Regional Climate Centers (in the Northeast, Southeast, Midwest, High Plains, and Far 
West), the Climate Analysis Center of NOAA, and the National Climatic Data Center of 
NOAA. Considerable data on drought impacts have come from other sources including the 
government reports and the news media. As Changnon and Easterling (1989) have shown, 
highly useful information on drought impacts can be gleaned from news reports. 
CLIMATOLOGICAL CONDITIONS 
After the summer 1988 crops had been harvested, national interest and attention to 
the drought dwindled rapidly during the fall of 1988. President Reagan's Task Force on 
Drought summarized the drought effects and published their Final Report in December 1988 
(Interagency Drought Policy Committee, 1988). No top-level federal attention was given to 
maintaining a drought monitoring or planning activity during the winter of 1988-89. The 
apparent belief was the problem had or would disappear, and if it returned, crisis 
management would be employed again, as in 1988. 
Near to above average precipitation fell over many of the central and southeastern 
drought areas during the fall of 1988, further lessening fears over continued drought. 
Issuance of drought advisories by NOAA had ended. The drought severity pattern at the 
end of November 1988 is shown in figure lb. One notes that more intense dryness had 
developed in the central High Plains, and there was a continuing deficiency of moisture in 
the upper Rockies with apparent lessening of drought in California. 
The only agricultural concerns were regional and were largely related to winter wheat 
being planted in the fall in the High Plains and Northwest. At the national level, worries 
about an "agricultural drought" in 1989 were not apparent. Concerns over "hydrologic 
drought," or deficient water supplies, did persist in portions of the western Midwest, the 
Missouri River Basin, and California. However, the winter is a period of low water demand 
and negligible evaporation; hence concerns over a water supply drought also did not surface 
at the national level at the end of 1988. 
The winter (December-February) of 1988-89 brought, as usual, mixed amounts of 
precipitation across the nation. Many areas in the central U.S. and northeast experienced 
below normal snowfalls, and, in general, below normal precipitation prevailed in the High 
Plains and western Corn Belt. Figure 1c presents the drought pattern at the end of 
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February. At this time, the start of spring, four areas of serious drought were evident: 1) 
central California (again), 2) the central High Plains (Kansas), 3) the northern Rockies, and 
4) the western Midwest. Dryness was beginning in the New York area. Fears were growing 
over the developing soil moisture shortage, particularly in the winter red wheat growing 
areas of Kansas, Nebraska, western Oklahoma, and west Texas. 
Spring (March-May) conditions in the United States featured extremely heavy and 
persistent precipitation from eastern Texas eastward and northward up the Ohio River 
Valley and into New York and New England. The wet late spring with much above normal 
May rainfalls in the northeast, effectively ended the feared "hydrologic drought" in the 
northeast (Northeast Regional Climate Center, July 1989). It also terminated the drought-
like conditions in the southeastern United States which had persisted since 1982 (Southeast 
Climate Center, June 1989). The spring precipitation, however, did not alleviate the 
agricultural drought (soil moisture) problems of the western Corn Belt and the central-
southern High Plains (Midwestern Climate Center, June 1989). Winter and spring 
precipitation was also deficient in central and southern California, leaving the area in a 
drought position as shown in figure 1d (Western Regional Climate Center, May 1989). May 
rainfall in the western Midwest and southwestern U.S. ranked as the 16th driest in the past 
95 years (Heim, 1989). 
Drought conditions at the end of May 1989 were significant across the United States 
and more extensive than those in May 1988. For example, the areal extent of areas with 
severe or extreme drought in the U.S. was 31.5%, ranking as the 8th greatest areal extent 
since 1895 (see Table 1). In May, 43.8% of the Mississippi River Basin had extreme long-
term drought, with only the May values of 1931, 1934, 1941, and 1954 exhibiting greater 
extents of severe drought (Fig. 2). For the Corn and Soybean Belt, the areal extent of 
extreme severe drought in May 1989 was 41.8%, ranking as the 8th largest value and greater 
than 1988. The drought severity pattern at the beginning of the 1989 summer is shown in 
figure 1d. 
The south and east received very heavy late spring and June rainfalls. The areas of 
severe drought in the United States had shifted to the west (California, New Mexico, 
Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, and Nevada). On a national basis, the drought conditions that 
began early in 1987 were still persisting well into the summer of 1989 (see Fig. 1d). The 
spring of 1989 became the fifth consecutive spring season in the U.S. with below average 
precipitation. The only comparable historical period of consecutive dry springs was 1913-
1917. 
The information on figures 2, 3, and 4 demonstrate two important factors about the 
drought continuing into 1989. One is that severe drought conditions existed across large 
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Figure 2. The areal extent of severe and extreme drought over the contiguous United 
States for 1984-1989 (National Climatic Data Center). 
Figure 3. The areal extent of extreme drought in the Mississippi River Basin during May, 
1895-1989 (National Climatic Data Center). 
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Figure 4. The percent of average precipitation in California basins for October 1988 
through April 1989 (Western Regional Climate Center, 1989). 
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portions of the United States at the start of summer 1989. Second, the graph of drought 
extent for the period 1984 to June 1989 (Fig. 2) indicates that on a national basis, the 
drought that began in early 1987 had persisted through the first half of 1989. This was 
contrary to the early spring predictions of the U.S. Department of Agriculture which 
indicated little chance for drought continuing into 1989. The primary locations of drought 
in 1988 had largely shifted to different parts of the nation by June 1989 (CAC, July 1989). 
The graphs by Heim (1989) for Nebraska and Kansas (Figs. 5 and 6) show that the winter 
1988-spring 1989 precipitation values, the period of winter wheat growth, were extremely low 
(lowest on record for Nebraska and third worst in Kansas). 
Table 1. Mays having as much or more of the contiguous United States 
in severe or extreme long-term drought than May 1989. 










Figure 5. The October-May precipitation for 1895-1989 in Nebraska (National Climatic 
Data Center). 




The continuance of the drought into the first nine months of 1989 had its greatest 
effects on U.S. agriculture. These effects reflected a continuing financial instability for many 
individual fanners, agribusiness, and the farm markets. The agricultural effects also led to 
considerable governmental attention to drought with many adjustments offered, and a few 
accomplished, between January 1 and August 31, 1989. Clearly, the agricultural drought 
effects and adjustments were of great regional and national concern (USA Today, July 27 
and August 30, 1989). The agricultural effects of the 1988-89 drought are presented 
according to those 1) at the individual level, the winter wheat farmers, the livestock 
producers, the midwestern corn and grain farmers; 2) the grain market; 3) agribusiness; and 
4) leading to the governmental adjustments to these impacts. 
Winter Wheat Farmers 
One of the three most notable areas of individual impact of the 1989 drought, was 
to the winter wheat farmers in Kansas, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and west Texas. Kansas and 
Nebraska in particular experienced the greatest weather problems. Problems began as the 
drought intensified during a dry fall of 1988; then this was followed by an overly warm 
December and January, which was ended abruptly by an extremely cold February (a 
combination leading to "winter kill" to the young winter wheat plants); then late winter-early 
spring dust storms damaged the young wheat; and finally much above normal temperatures 
(days in the 90°F level) came in April and May along with low precipitation to further 
damage the wheat crop (see Figures 5 and 6). 
Winter wheat comes in three types and each is grown in a different area of the 
United States. Hard red winter wheat (the type used for bread) is grown in the southern 
and central High Plains (Nebraska, Kansas, Texas, Oklahoma); soft winter wheat is grown 
largely in the Corn Belt and is used for products like crackers; and white winter wheat is 
grown in the northwest and is used largely for export to the Orient. Thus, damages to the 
hard red winter wheat crop of the High Plains could lead to problems in wheat supplies for 
bread, and in turn, to increased consumer prices. The USDA reported in January that the 
planting of winter wheat, which had been done in the fall of 1988, was down 12% from that 
in prior years (Champaign News-Gazette, January 17). This reflected soil moisture concerns 
of the Great Plains farmers based on the dry conditions during the fall-winter of 1988 (see 
Fig. 1b). 
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Problems with the hard red winter wheat crop became national news by early April. 
At that point it was announced that at least 25% of the Kansas wheat crop had been lost 
due to the drought with similar problems in west Texas, Oklahoma, eastern Colorado, and 
Nebraska (Los Angeles Times, April 10). The damages at that time led economists to 
speculate that bread prices would rise 10% during 1989. 
The drying effects of the drought in the winter wheat sectors of the High Plains led 
to dust storms in April. The dust clouds spread eastward to Illinois and Indiana (Los 
Angeles Times, April 10). The blowing dust particles damaged stems of the winter wheat 
plants. 
Political attention to the problems in the High Plains became evident in early April. 
Congress and the USDA began to debate the severity of the problem and the potential 
adjustments (see section on Government Reactions and Adjustments). Questions were being 
raised as to whether it was "too late for rain to help?". 
By mid-April, the Kansas Wheat Board reported that 76% of the winter wheat was 
in poor condition. By late April, the estimate was that 48% of the winter wheat crop had 
been lost in Kansas, and the Kansas members of Congress were after the Bush 
Administration to act (Chicago Tribune, April 23). It was further reported that 30% of the 
winter wheat acres would be abandoned; that is, not worthy of harvesting. 
The USDA, continuing its cautious approach to addressing the problem, announced 
on April 27 that the "total" wheat harvest of the United States would be up considerably 
from 1988 when the U.S. production had dropped to 1.81 billion bushels (due to the 1988 
drought). The USDA expected the 1989 wheat crop to produce 2.1 billion bushels, but 
notably it would not be enough to rebuild depleted U.S. stockpiles (AP, April 27). The 
USDA forecast for wheat stocks as of June 1, 1989, was for a meager 549 million bushels, 
down 1.3 billion bushels from June 1, 1988 and down 1.82 billion bushels from June 1, 1987. 
Amidst growing concern in Kansas over the winter wheat crop, federal responses to 
the requested federal relief actions were not forthcoming. The USDA, on May 11, 
announced that Kansas, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Texas wheat production would be down 
30%, with the U.S. winter wheat total production down 8% from 1988 (Chicago Tribune, 
May 11). However, Kansas winter wheat production was predicted to be down 37%, with 
the national total hard red wheat production for 1989 down 21% over the prior-year 
average. The winter wheat loss estimated at $800 million (McGraw News, May 11). The 
wheat reduction predicted by USDA of only 8% nationally was due to the expected high 
yields of soft red winter wheat in the Midwest which was predicted to be above average 
(Chicago Tribune, May 12). The USDA admitted in May that U.S. wheat exports would 
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decline by 300 million bushels from prior years for the year beginning June 1, 1989. In 
general, the federal government in the late spring was portraying the U.S. wheat picture in 
an optimistic manner, and in effect down playing the regional problems of the red winter 
wheat farmers in Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas (Reuters, May 12). 
Extremely high temperatures in the High Plains during late April and early May with 
maximum temperatures in the 90's on several days brought further damage to the wheat 
crop. Yet, the USDA pronounced on May 15 that "U.S. wheat production will meet world 
desires and the losses of the High Plains would not essentially affect our production" (U.S. 
News and World Report, May 15). Winter wheat harvest began in Texas and Oklahoma in 
late May with the wheat crop still predicted to be bad in Kansas. The yields in Kansas were 
reduced 38%. 
Kansas and other winter wheat area farmers with losses waited with concern as 
Congress debated when and how much aid to extend to them during June, July, and August. 
By mid-July, USDA had shifted its views from "relief only for the winter wheat farmers" 
position to expanding drought relief to many other crops (AP, July 12). The 1989 wheat 
damage in Kansas was estimated in mid-July as creating a statewide production of 211 
million bushels, as compared to 323 million bushels in .1988, a 35% reduction (Farm Week, 
July 17). 
Problems with the 1989 spring wheat crop in the northern plains became an issue. 
In mid-July, the Governor of North Dakota estimated the statewide crop losses at $540 
million due to the spring wheat (Reuters, July 17). In its August 1 crop report, the USDA 
estimated that the U.S. spring wheat crop production would be 12% less than the USDA 
July 1 estimate. The extent of the losses to the spring wheat crop were still being estimated 
when this report was prepared, but yields were depressed in Montana, North Dakota, and 
South Dakota (USA Today, August 30). Regardless, the 1989 wheat production was 
severely impacted by the 1989 drought. In late August, the USDA announced that the 
"lingering drought" continued to drain U.S. grain reserves (New Gazette, August 25b). 
World stockpiles of wheat are the lowest since 1975. By the end of August, the USDA 
estimated the annual production downward to 2.04 billion bushels which was 13% above 
1988 (News Gazette, August 25b). This compares to annual usage, including exports, of 2.29 
billion bushels. The USDA predicted exports would decline 10%, to less than 1.3 billion 
bushels. The drought of 1989 had produced sizable impacts. The new estimate for the June 
1, 1990 stockpile of wheat was for 474 million bushels, down 15% from the 1989 stocks. 
51 
Livestock Producers 
The second group of individuals severely affected by drought during the winter-spring 
1989 were livestock producers with herds in the states of Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska, Kansas, 
Oklahoma, Texas and New Mexico. The winter and spring (March-May) precipitation values 
in these states were low. The 1989 spring ranked as the second driest since 1895 in 
Nebraska and New Mexico, fifth driest in Colorado, 9th driest in Iowa, 11th driest in Kansas, 
15th driest in Missouri, and 18th driest in Oklahoma and Texas (Heim, 1989). 
The drought problem producers experienced was two-fold. First, continuing drought 
in these feeding areas had greatly reduced the quality of grass in their pasturelands. Second, 
the 1988 drought in the Corn Belt led to low production of corn and soybean meal which 
had greatly increased the prices of these feeding supplements for livestock (News-Gazette, 
May 11). Thus, the impact of the drought of 1988 on livestock producers became extremely 
serious during the spring of 1989 (High Plains Climate Center, May 1989). Assessments in 
May 1989 revealed, for example, that U.S. food prices in 1989 were going to rise 5.5 to 6% 
due to the drought, and principally due to the cost of feeding livestock. This increase of up 
to 6% (acknowledged by the USDA in May 1989) was much higher than the USDA had 
forecast in November 1988 when it predicted a 1989 rise of 3 to 5%. Secretary Yuetter of 
USDA announced on June 30 the increase in food prices in 1989 would probably be 7%, 
reflecting an ever growing increase in food prices related to drought (and a serious 
estimation error on the part of the USDA). It was further announced in May 1989 that the 
effect of the drought of 1988-89 would produce a major and long-term impact on the U.S. 
beef industry due to the poor pastures and increased feed prices (News-Gazette, May 11). 
The continuing problem of the U.S. livestock producers was evident in Congress 
beginning in early April, and a series of "relief actions" were accomplished by the federal 
government (see section on Government Reactions and Adjustments). 
Examples of the problems faced include the price of hay in the Midwest (UPI, April 
24). In April 1988 hay cost $65 a ton in the Midwest, but it had risen to $131 a ton by April 
1989. In Iowa, 78% of all pastures were defined as "dry" by mid-April. The Governor of 
Iowa announced on April 25 that 40% of Iowa's pastures were ruined for cattle in 1989, and 
further reported that liquidation of cattle herds in Iowa had begun because of the lack of 
pastures or producers inability to afford feed at the higher prices (UPI, April 25). 
Further problems were noted in May when an abnormally large number of hog deaths 
were reported. These were attributed to the poor quality of the 1988 grain and its high toxin 
content (AP, May 11). The problems of cattle raisers in the High Plains continued to be 
severe into May and June. It was reported during May that cattle slaughters in Missouri and 
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Kansas were up 50% over those in 1988 (Financial Times, May 19). The federal 
government performed a series of actions aimed at relieving the stress on the livestock 
producer. 
The continued drought into the summer of 1989, with higher grain prices both from 
the 1988 and 1989 drought seasons was predicted to lead to a major liquidation of the 
national hog herd (Farm Week, July 3). This was expected to lead to a cut in pork 
production in 1990. The drought had not only produced higher feed costs, but had 
weakened hog prices and brought low returns to the producers. By June 1, 1989, there were 
3% fewer breeding hogs than on June 1, 1988, as hog producers adjusted to the drought 
problems. As the summer of 1989 progressed, USDA continued to expand its assistance to 
livestock producers through allowances for haying and grazing. By late July, it was noted 
that the number of cattle in feedlots was down 6% in the 13 major states of production over 
the July value in 1988 (Farm Week, July 24d). By late summer, the USDA announced that 
the increased grain production of 1989 (over that in 1988) would lead to lower feed prices 
and in turn this would lead to increased poultry production (News Gazette, August 18). 
Corn Belt Farmers 
The principal impacts to farmers not involved in winter wheat or 1989 livestock 
problems occurred in the Midwest. There, farmers had suffered extreme drought in 1988 
but were not experiencing crop problems with another drought until the summer of 1989. 
Certain effects were "delayed" from the 1988 drought and were occurring during the winter 
and spring of 1989. The Midwestern drought was voted the top news story of 1988 on 
January 1 (News-Gazette, January 1). 
It was announced (in early March) that most Corn Belt farmers would participate in 
the grain set-aside (feed grain program), with only an expected 10% of all lands set-aside 
to fallow. However, many farmers could not afford additional land planting costs in 1989 
as a result of financial losses from the 1988 drought (News-Gazette, March 5a). It was 
further announced in early March that the 1988 drought had hurt the performance of pre-
emergence herbicides, and that Corn Belt farmers would have to use a greater amount of 
pre-planting plant herbicides to control weeds (News-Gazette, March 5c). The drought of 
1988 was being assessed in the Midwest during the spring of 1989 as one in a series of bad 
years economically for Corn Belt farmers that had begun in 1980 (News-Gazette, March 4). 
The early March assessment of drought effects in the Corn Belt was typified by the 
situation facing Illinois farmers. Crop yields in 1988 had been reduced by 30 to 40%, but 
the positive effects were that corn and soybean prices had increased during part of 1988, as 
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shown in figure 7 (News-Gazette, March 5d). Another negative effect was that livestock and 
hog production costs had risen as a result of increases in prices of soybean meal. Since the 
amount of set-aside land had been cut back for 1989, this action which would cause grain 
prices to go down. Further, farmers had considerable concern over the effect of aflatoxin, 
a toxic mold found in 1988 corn due to the drought and present in the 1988 corn stored for 
1989 feeding. 
Increases in farmland prices in the High Plains and Midwest occurred, largely as a 
result of "benefits" to many farmers resulting from the 1988 drought (News-Gazette, March 
5e). These benefits accrued only to those who had irrigated their crops or to those who had 
carryover stocks from 1987 and sold them off at the higher prices generated by the 1988 
drought. The USDA announced farm land prices were up 67% due to the drought (Chicago 
Tribune, May 8). 
Planting of corn and soybeans in Illinois, Iowa, and Missouri by May 1, 1989, was 
behind average. Chief Meteorologist Strommen of the USDA announced (Reuters, April 
26) on April 26 that he was "optimistic" about crop prospects for all U.S. crops planted in 
the spring because drought-related weather patterns were not prevalent. However, soil 
moisture on May 1 was reported low over 48% of Illinois, 50% of Missouri, and 68% of 
Iowa (News-Gazette, May 2), and the NOAA-issued drought analysis indicated serious soil 
moisture problems in the western Corn Belt and High Plains (CAC, May 1989). The general 
USDA expectation was that acreage planted to corn in 1989 would be increased due to 
government incentives. However, excessive spring wetness in Indiana and Ohio reduced corn 
planting by about 2 million acres less than the 73 million acres expected (Farm Weekly, June 
26). Illinois corn-soybean farmers facing their second year of drought at the end of August, 
decried the optimistic spring weather forecasts by meteorologists (Farm Week, August 21a). 
On May 7, a USDA announcement indicated that the 1988 drought had put between 
10,000 and 15,000 of the nation's 550,000 commercial farmers out of business (Los Angeles 
Times, May 7). The announcement indicated that a second dry year in 1989 would force an 
even larger number of farmers out of business. Another financial impact of the 1988 
drought in the Midwest was related to farm loans. The demand for farm loans during the 
spring of 1989 was up 15% from that of 1988 (UPI, May 16d). 
Another impact of the 1988 drought was being realized in potato farming. It was 
announced in May that the 1988 drought had caused a major loss of potatoes including 
seedlings in Wisconsin and Michigan, and prices were up from $6 a barrel in 1988 to $20 a 
barrel by May 1989 (UPI, May 13). Potato growers in Maine were benefitting from the 
Midwestern losses, but by late May their stock of potatoes was nearly depleted. Similarly, 
the cherry crop in Washington and other states was expected to be increased in 1989 (over 
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Figure 7. Monthly fluctuations in prices of Illinois corn, 1986 to 1989 (Farm Week). 
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1988), but to be less than average (AP, June 29). 
By the end of May 1989, a considerable climate contrast existed in the Midwest for 
the corn and soybean farmers (Midwestern Climate Center, June 1989). In the eastern Corn 
Belt (Indiana and Ohio) the spring weather had been unusually wet and cold, leading to 
delayed planting (Christian Science Monitor, May 17). Furthermore, delayed planting had 
increased the farm requests for short duration corn hybrids and hybrid supplies of this type 
were not adequate to meet the demand (UPI, June 16). Many shifted to soybeans, and Ohio 
expected its 1989 yields of corn and soybeans to be 30% below average (UPI, June 5b). On 
the west end of the Corn Belt (northwestern Illinois, large parts of Iowa, northern Missouri, 
and southern Minnesota), the opposite condition existed (Farm Week, June 5, June 19). 
There, soil moisture was inadequate, as of June 30, to result in average corn yields. Rains 
in July would be critical (Farm Week, July 26a). 
In early July a new problem related to the drought of 1988 became apparent in the 
Corn Belt. Herbicides applied to soybeans in 1988 were left in the soil due to deficient 
1988-89 precipitation, and in such fields where corn was planted in 1989, damages began to 
appear by the end of June (Farm Week, July 3c). This problem escalated in Iowa with a 
group of farmers filing a class action suit against three firms producing the herbicides 
(American Cynamid, Elanco Products Company, and MFC Corporation). The farmers 
claimed that the products had hurt corn in Iowa, Illinois, Nebraska, Wisconsin, Michigan, 
Indiana, and Ohio from 1988 applications. The chemical firms reacted and collectively 
developed a pact (Farm Week, July 24b). The companies agreed to handle farmers damage 
claims, but only after company officials perform in-field assessments. Losses would be paid 
by the three chemical companies involved. 
The first two weeks of July were notable in the Corn Belt and the High Plains for 
having much above normal temperatures and very little precipitation (Chicago Tribune, July 
8). Concerns grew rapidly during this sensitive period of corn tasseling and pollination when 
hot, dry conditions can be very damaging to corn. The USDA's July 1 estimates relating to 
corn production and surpluses showed major decreases over earlier estimates. The 1988 fall 
surplus was 4.25 billion bushels of corn and 302 billion bushels of soybeans; but by July 1 
their estimates of 1989 (fall) surpluses were down to 2.0 billion bushels of corn, and 125 
billion bushels of beans (Farm Week, July 10a). 
Concerns continued during July over the weather stress to Corn Belt crops (CAC, 
July 1989). Rains were very isolated and it was difficult to estimate effects on yields (Farm 
Week, July 10b). The weather stress of July in the Corn Belt and High Plains became 
national news with awareness that damage to the corn crop was occurring for the "second 
year in a row" (Reuters, July 12). 
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Drought-related problems of other types prevailed. For example, 1989 grasshopper 
outbreaks in Minnesota had led to an estimated $20 million loss and special insecticide 
legislation was passed by the Minnesota legislature, leading to clashes with environmentalists 
(Los Angeles Times, July 16). Drought damages to the spring wheat crop led the Governor 
of North Dakota to declare the state a disaster area. In the midst of growing worries, the 
USDA issued new estimates about acreage planted (Farm Week, July 17b). The 1989 
acreage in soybeans planted was 61.3 million acres, 4% more than 1988 and 6% more than 
1987. The corn acreage planted was estimated at 72.7 million acres, also higher than the 
67.6 million acres in 1988, but less than the USDA's March 1 estimate of 73.3 million acres 
of corn. The North Dakota spring wheat losses were estimated on July 17 at $540 million 
(Reuters, July 17). 
The Corn Belt weather changed dramatically during the week of July 16-22 with 
widespread rains of 1 to 3 inches (Midwestern Climate Center, August 1989). These rains 
were noted to have fended off crop disaster (Farm Week, July 24a). Corn crops in western 
and northern Illinois, large parts of Iowa, and parts of Missouri and Minnesota were not 
"made" but were saved from likely disaster. At this stage, the USDA announced for the first 
time that it would support relief aid to U.S. corn growers due to the drought of 1989 (News 
Gazette, July 25a). 
Concerns then began to focus on soybeans in the Corn Belt which depend heavily on 
August rainfall conditions to produce good yields. The outlook for conditions were seen as 
good in Illinois according to the agricultural experts (News Gazette, August 4). One benefit 
related the generally wetter and cooler conditions of the 1989 summer than those of 1988 
was the reduction and concerns over the aflatoxin content in corn, a major problem in 1988. 
The lower temperatures in 1989 reduced the threat of a repeat of an aflatoxin outbreak 
(News Gazette, August 13). 
Early August crop assessments performed by the private firms and USDA produced 
important new views. One major impact was that the August 1 USDA crop report showed 
their expectations for the 1989 corn crop had decreased to 7.35 billion bushels (and less than 
most private firm expectations) (Farm Week, August 14b). Scientists issued words of 
caution of another weather problem, the likelihood of early frost (Farm Week, August 28a). 
The expected U.S. surplus of corn in the fall of 1989 was reduced to 1.68 billion bushels 
from the 1.83 billion estimated one month earlier, July 1. Bean production was similarly 
downgraded in August with a reduction in expected yield per acre from 33 to 32.3 bushels. 
By late August, 47 percent of the nation's soybean crop covering 19 states was judged as fair 
to very poor, reflecting the drought effects (Farm Week, August 21a). 
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Late rains in August across the Corn Belt of 0.5 to 3 inches in most areas produced 
mixed effects. It promised to help yields of late maturing soybeans but it also delayed 
maturity of crops and increased the likelihood of "late harvest" and threat of frost damage 
(News Gazette, August 25a). The 1988 drought induced corn and soybean losses led to use 
of most supplies in elevators across the Corn Belt, and elevators faced the 1989 harvest with 
adequate space for storage. The drought of 1988 and 1989 (low soil moisture levels), 
coupled with below normal spring 1989 temperatures, led to late planting of corn and 
soybeans across much of the Corn Belt. Later crop maturity brought forth fears of major 
losses due to early frosts. Two private sector meteorologists issued late August forecasts 
indicating a high likelihood of earlier than normal frost in the Corn Belt (Farm Week, 
August 28a and b). 
The final verdict for soybean yields and drought effects for 1989 are as yet 
unavailable. Figure 8 depicts the uncertainty that existed over bean yields in late August, 
as well as yield fluctuations in recent years. Farmers in Illinois and Iowa were seeking in 
late August, governmental relief (Farm Week, August 21b). Iowa corn yields were assessed 
downward in late August and were predicted to be less than the 110 bu/acre prediction for 
statewide average yields issued by USDA on August 1 (Farm Week, August 28b). 
Agribusiness 
Most U.S. agribusinesses had been affected by the 1988 drought, in both positive 
and/or negative ways. Many large agribusinesses during the summer of 1988 had developed 
corporate drought task forces, and these in turn evolved new plans for marketing, 
production, and sales in 1988-89. One company formed its own weather information group, 
and increased purchases of weather information and climate predictions were noted in 1988 
and continuing into 1989. 
One agribusiness sector considerably affected by the drought was the weather 
insurance industry. The Farm Relief Act of 1988 required that any farmer accepting relief 
payments would have to purchase all-weather peril insurance during 1989 and 1990. Thus, 
sales did increase in 1989, and purchases of crop-weather insurance were much above levels 
expected by major insurance companies, nearly doubling the 1988 sales level. 
Several Midwestern seed growing firms experienced severe losses of seed crops in 
1988 (News-Gazette, March 4). Thus, during the 1988-89 winter season, they took out 
contracts to grow large amounts of seed crops in Texas, Florida, and South America. 
Several firms also had largely consumed their hold-over stocks in attempting to meet 1989 
demands for seed corn and soybean seed. There was insufficient short-term hybrids 
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available for Indiana and Ohio farmers facing a short season due to late spring wet and cold 
conditions. 
Figure 8. Fluctuations in U.S. soybean yields and late August Scenarios for 1989 yields 
(Farm Week). 
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The farm machinery manufacturing industry announced in March 1989 it was 
enthusiastic about future sales in 1989 (News-Gazette, March 5d). However, retailers of 
farm machinery were not optimistic about large sales in 1989. Optimism about purchases, 
both of farm machinery and farmland, developed because there were low carryover stocks, 
higher commodity prices were expected, an expected increase in farm income, and with more 
land going into production in 1989 due to government incentives to grow more grain. 
Another agribusiness severely affected by the 1988 drought was the rain insurance 
industry. The CHUBB Insurance Group paid out (on April 20) $19.2 million in 2,838 checks 
to farmers in 10 states who had settled a lawsuit over rain insurance (News-Gazette, April 
21). CHUBB had already paid out $37.4 million to farmers for their insured losses. 
Litigation had involved more than 7,257 farmers. In turn, the CHUBB Group and 8,800 
farmers jointly sued Good Weather International Corporation (the company in the CHUBB 
Group that provided the 1988 rain insurance coverage) for an undetermined amount. They 
accused Good Weather of selling more policies than CHUBB had authorized (UPI, July 13). 
A trial began on July 12 in Cincinnati in the U.S. District Court with the farmers asking 
damages of $20 million in addition to unspecified punitive damages against Good Weather 
International Corporation. This activity was in addition to the agreement between the 
farmers and CHUBB for a settlement of $48.1 million made in November 1988 to meet 
farmer claims. CHUBB claimed that Good Weather violated its contract by selling too many 
crop insurance policies and claimed that Good Weather owed CHUBB at least $75 million 
because of the payoff costs and fees for the lawyers CHUBB had hired. In turn, Good 
Weather denied all claims by the farmers and CHUBB. By mid-August, the law suit had 
been settled out of court. The farmers endorsed a settlement of $4.93 million to them with 
$3.7 million to CHUBB Corporation (News Gazette, August 15) from Good Weather 
International Corporation, indicating willingness of the lawyers to settle because they 
considered Good Weather now had a "negative worth." 
Agribusiness financial groups including farm banks also were affected. This involved 
the bankruptcy and abandonment of 10,000 farms with many mortgaged with local farm 
banks. However, most banks in the Midwest reported no major losses in 1988 (UPI, June 
1). Also, farm loans had increased in the spring of 1989 by 15% over the number in 1988. 
Firms owning grain elevators in the Corn Belt were heavily impacted by the 1988 
drought. Large surpluses in storage from 1987 were systematically reduced during late 1988 
and 1989, and the railroads and barge shippers continuously moved grain out of the Corn 
Belt in the spring and summer of 1989. Thus, the elevators had room to store the 1989 
harvest of corn and soybeans (News Gazette, September 3). The grain storage companies 
expected to realize increased income in late 1989-1990 because farmers would be paying 
more to have the late maturing crop dried at the elevators, and because of increased storage 
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income since farmers were expected to hold and not sell (News Gazette, August 25a). 
Governmental Reactions and Adjustments to the 1989 Agricultural-Drought Problems 
Most state and federal governmental reactions to the agricultural drought problems 
during the winter and spring 1989 were due to two areas of concern: the problems of the 
High Plains winter wheat farmers and the problems of the livestock producers concentrated 
in the western Corn Belt and the High Plains. During the summer of 1989 concerns over 
drought effects to the Corn Belt brought further governmental actions. 
Governmental reactions to these three agricultural problems first appeared during the 
spring of 1989 when Senator Bond of Missouri announced in early April that Congress would 
need to provide drought relief in 1989 to address the wheat problems in Kansas (UPI, April 
4). Prior to that, few changes in agricultural policies were foreseen in Congress (News-
Gazette, March 5b). 
The winter wheat problems became national news during the first week of April, and 
by April 9, members of Congress had begun drafting disaster relief legislation for wheat 
farmers (Reuters, April 10). At the same time, the Bush Administration and the USDA 
disagreed with Congress about the need for relief, indicating that the severity of the drought 
was still uncertain and that it was too early to react (Los Angeles Times, April 10). The 
USDA's chief meteorologist was quoted in March as saying it was too "premature" to assess 
the 1989 drought and that weather patterns of 1989 were different than that of the 1988 
drought patterns (Los Angeles Times, April 10). 
The major initial debate was whether it was "too late for rain to help the crop." 
Essentially USDA was saying "no, it's not too late," whereas the wheat farmers and their 
Congressional members were saying "yes, that it was too late." The winter kill of the wheat 
also had disastrous effects. 
Arguments raised in early April in Congress concerned whether to use relief measures 
for the wheat farmers or to allow national crop insurance to serve those who had decided 
to purchase it (Reuters, April 10). Failure of crop-weather insurance to be widely purchased 
by the U.S. farming community had been a continuing problem since 1982. Disaster 
payments had been stopped in 1982 basically to encourage the purchase of crop-weather 
insurance, but by 1988 only 29% of the agricultural lands of the United States were insured 
by U.S. farmers and the program was being severely questioned (Reuters, April 10). The 
1988 Drought Assistance Act with nearly $4 billion in relief payments had further eroded 
interest in insurance and contradicted the 1982 policy. One of the basic premises by Wheat 
61 
Belt Congressmen was "anyone hurt by this natural disaster deserves assistance." Thus, the 
"insurance versus relief" controversy was a major issue relating to securing special relief for 
the winter wheat farmers. 
By April 23, the damage to the Kansas wheat crop was estimated at 48% of crop loss, 
and the Kansas Senators and Representatives were openly seeking special relief in deference 
to the "hold off" position of the Administration (Chicago Tribune, April 23). 
At the same time, another form of agricultural relief but one related to the livestock 
sector developed. An interesting set of events began on April 25 when the Governor of 
Iowa requested the USDA Secretary Yuetter to: 1) open up grazing land in the set-aside 
program and in the Conservation Reserve Program, and 2) let livestock producers obtain 
cheaper feed by use of government subsidy or purchase from government grain stocks (UPI, 
April 25). The drought effects on livestock feeding were seen in Washington as a problem 
easier to solve than the regional wheat problem, and the Administration acted quickly. On 
the next day, April 26, the USDA announced that if a county had lost 40% or more of its 
pastures, it "qualified" and could cut the hay on idle land or graze livestock on idle land 
(Reuters, April 26). 
On April 27, the USDA announced that farmers could also purchase surplus grain 
from the Commodity Credit Corporation at half price. Secretary Yuetter also established 
a Drought Task Force to monitor the drought with the assignment to evaluate the question 
of extending relief payments because of 1989 crop losses (AP, April 27). 
Concern over the losses to wheat plus those to other crops reappeared in the 
Congress in early May. This followed the USDA's announcement on April 27 which had 
optimistically noted that the U.S. total wheat harvest for 1989 would be up from last year 
when production had dropped to 1.8 billion bushels; USDA was predicting 2.1 billion bushels 
as a national crop in 1989 (AP, April 27). Regardless, in early May, Wheat Belt legislators 
reacted and began to seek a drought relief plan much like that written in 1988 (UPI, May 
3). Hearings about the crop losses were held by Congressmen in Texas and Kansas, and 
Senator Dole stated that the cost of a 1989 agricultural drought relief plan would be 
approximately $350 million (UPI, May 4). He further indicated that this cost would be offset 
by much smaller crop subsidy payments because of the lower wheat yields. USDA 
responded on the same day (May 5) indicating they were "watching the weather conditions." 
On May 11, Secretary Yuetter of USDA surprisingly announced that farm drought 
relief, like that in 1988, "may be necessary" in the winter wheat areas (Chicago Tribune, May 
11). The degree of estimated loss in the Great Plains was 21%, with Kansas down 37%. 
62 
Weather scientists of NOAA issued a prediction on this date that the drought was expected 
to continue in Kansas and the High Plains (News-Gazette, May 11). 
The other major form of "agricultural relief under consideration," the assistance 
allowed the livestock producers through use of set-aside areas for grazing, grew. On May 
9, USDA announced that emergency grazing had been permitted in 158 counties in Iowa, 
Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, Texas, and California (UPI, May 9). By May 16 
(7 days later), grazing land relief had been extended to 323 counties (UPI, May 16a). 
By mid-May, several governors brought their states into the drought debates. On 
May 16, the Governors of Kansas, South Dakota and North Dakota asked Congress for help 
in passing a drought relief bill (UPI, May 16b). Congress agreed (UPI, May 16c). On May 
22 the Governor of Wisconsin convened a Drought Task Force because of the severe 
damage to the alfalfa crop (UPI, May 24), and the Governor of Illinois assembled his 
Drought Task Force on May 24 (Chicago Tribune, May 24). Iowa established for livestock 
producers, an emergency water plan (UPI, May 22b). 
On May 24, Secretary Yuetter further relaxed the rules on use of conservation lands 
for grazing (Reuters, May 24). The new ruling allowed all conservation lands to be eligible 
in states (not counties) where 75% of the counties had been locally designated as "drought 
stricken." By June 5, the USDA announced that 582 counties in 16 states had been 
approved for "aid"; that is, permission to harvest hay and graze livestock on harvested acres 
(UPI, June 5a), and this grew to 678 counties by June 12 (UPI, June 13). 
On May 25, the House of Representatives passed a $1 billion relief bill extending the 
provisions of the 1988 relief act (Reuters, May 25). That is, a fanner would receive 65% 
of the target price of a crop if his crop losses were greater than 35% of his normal 
production. The Bush Administration said "no"; indicating that it was too soon to act on 
relief. Also, Secretary Yuetter wanted an agreement with Congress that after 1989, only 
crop insurance would be used as a "disaster protection." This reawakened the issue over the 
crop insurance vs. disaster relief approaches with its own internal conflicts within Congress. 
Yuetter toured the drought areas in late May presumably to show concern of the 
Administration (UPI, May 30). 
The House Committee approved the drought bill on May 26 with the USDA 
indicating disapproval. The House passed the $1 billion aid bill on June 27 (AP, June 27). 
Wheat Belt Senators were also trying to extend the 1988 Farm Relief Bill within the 
Senate. Senator Bond (MO) asked USDA for relief aid beyond the grazing acreage and 
haying privileges. He also called for a change in the crop insurance program (UPI, June 12). 
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On June 2, Senator Leahy, Chairman of the Agricultural Committee in the Senate, indicated 
the Senate would "wait" before entertaining legislation on farm relief (AP, June 2). He 
indicated that further monitoring of the weather and other crops was needed. An important 
debate that was present concerned whether the 1989 drought relief action should include "all 
crops" or just winter wheat. The Senate resolved its internal differences in mid-June; it 
unanimously passed a $300 million rural development program, and Senators Leahy and 
Lugar (the ranking members of the Agricultural Committee) agreed to "act on July 19 on 
drought relief (AP, June 14). Senator Dole was expected to seek only relief for winter 
wheat growers, but others would want help for livestock producers (Chicago Tribune, June 
28). On June 28, President Bush announced that he would oppose the proposed Drought 
Relief Bill because it contained too many crops under its "umbrella" (AP, June 28). Iowa 
leaders continued to criticize the USDA's drought policies (UPI, June 27). 
As the summer of 1989 continued, other extreme weather conditions around the 
nation began to detrimentally affect the "summer planted crops." Pressures appeared in 
Washington from rice and cotton farmers in the south where more than double the average 
spring and summer rainfall had occurred, producing overly wet soils and flooding, and 
obvious future crop reductions due to poor yields and decreased planting. Extreme wetness 
and below normal temperatures in the eastern Corn Belt during April, May, and June 
delayed and then canceled considerable corn planting, decreasing the USDA's expected 
planted acreage from 73 to 71 million acres. 
Furthermore, continuing dryness in the western Corn Belt during the spring and 
summer of 1989 likely would create below average yields in both corn and soybeans. By 
mid-July, the Governor of North Dakota had declared that state a drought disaster area with 
expected losses of greater than $0.5 billion due to spring wheat damages (Reuters, July 17). 
These major weather impacts from the 1989 drought and overly wet conditions increasingly 
entered into Congressional debates and the Administration's policies that were evolving 
during the summer of 1989, and in particular, on the dimensions of agricultural relief for 
U.S. farmers. 
By early July, the USDA's posture on the seriousness of the continuing drought and 
the overall impact of the drought of 1988 and that of 1989 was of interest. Secretary 
Yuetter analyzed the drought depleted stocks and concluded that we have a "comfortable 
supply" (Bureau of National Affairs, July 5). He further announced that "1989 is a strange 
weather year" (Figure 9). Also in early July, the USDA, based on its July 1 crop estimates 
announced two important facts. First, that the expected 1989 corn production of 7.85 billion 
bushels as estimated in March was reduced to 7.45 billion bushels (Reuters, July 12). No 
decrease in soybean production was seen at that time. Second, Secretary Yuetter of USDA 
indicated that for the first time the government might have to "expand" its assistance to 
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Figure 9. The patterns of departures of summer (June-August) precipitation and mean 
temperatures from normal, and departure of soil moisture values from normal 
at end of August for the Midwest (Midwestern Climate Center, 1989). 
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farmers due to losses to several crops in 1989, repeating that it is "an unusual weather year." 
By these statements, the USDA had shifted its policy from a wheat-only relief to that to 
include many other major crops including rice and cotton (AP, July 12). By mid-July, the 
Governor of North Dakota had declared the state a disaster area due to the drought damage 
to the spring wheat, with the winter wheat loss in Kansas being estimated at $1 billion (Los 
Angeles Times, July 16). Secretary Yuetter then announced in mid-July the need to provide 
relief to farmers that had experienced too much rain (Farm Week, July 17a). 
In the meantime, drought assistance to livestock producers continued to expand. The 
USDA announced in mid-July that drought aid for emergency hay and grazing of livestock 
had been extended to 925 counties and embraced 20 states including Pennsylvania (UPI, July 
17). The livestock feed assistance program had expanded to 250 counties in 14 states, and 
387 counties in 16 states had been approved for haying and/or grazing on Conservation 
Reserve Lands. 
The Senate finally came to grips with the agricultural relief act. The Agricultural 
Committee of the Senate met in mid-July and found itself with a politically-aligned debate 
over the dimensions of the relief bill. Republicans, led by Senator Dole of Kansas, wished 
to minimize the extent of the emergency aid, and Democrats wished to extend it beyond the 
bounds that the Republicans and Bush Administration wanted (AP, July 20). By July 25, the 
Agricultural Committee of the Senate had approved a Drought Relief Bill, with 10 
Democrats voting yes and the 9 Republicans voting no (UPI, July 25). This relief act 
provided approximately $1 billion for farm aid. 
The Senate continued to debate the dimensions of their version (not the House 
version) of the Agricultural Relief Act of 1989, the Administration spoke. Secretary Yuetter 
told the Governor of Iowa that 1) corn growers should be included in the assistance, and 2) 
that relief for soybean losses and other crops remained uncertain (News Gazette, July 25a). 
Yuetter further announced that the "pie" is set at $870 million for relief. In this fitful time, 
Senator Leahy, Chairman of the Agricultural Committee, indicated that he wanted the relief 
bill agreed upon by both the House and Senate by August 4, the day before the Congress 
adjourned for its one-month summer vacation. The Administration threatened to veto any 
act if it exceeded $1 billion. Basically, the Republicans only wanted relief to go to farmers 
who had raised crops covered by "government price support program," that is, wheat, corn, 
rice, and cotton. This did not satisfy the Democrats who also wished to include soybeans 
and other damaged crops. Senator Dole announced that he would scuttle any bill over $1 
billion and that the Democratic version amounting to $955 million was too high. The Senate 
Agricultural Committee met on July 25 and the Republican members agreed to accept 
soybeans as well as program crops for relief, but the Committee then disagreed over the 
levels of coverage for each crop (News Gazette, July 26). 
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Agricultural interests around the nation became highly sensitized to the political 
discord which was seen as jeopardizing the chances for enacting a relief bill (Farm Week, 
July 31b). The American Farm Bureau supported the Democratic version of the bill and 
did not desire discrimination among producers of different crops. 
In early August, the Senate resolved a parallel problem, the Rural Development 
Program (News Gazette, August 3). In an effort to complete its work before its 
adjournment on August 5, the Senate Agricultural Committee developed a "package" on 
August 2, and approved a 1989 Drought Relief Act amounting to $885 million seen as "fair 
to all" (News Gazette, August 3). On August 4, the fitful day before the Congressional 
vacation, the House and Senate agreed to a mixed relief package set at $900 million by 
resolving that relief would go to producers of all crops, but that payments be set at varying 
levels (News Gazette, August 5). Secretary Yuetter indicated that the approved level of 
$900 million was "acceptable." The bill that the House and Senate through compromise 
agreed upon provided the most extensive protection to farmers who had participated in 
federal farm programs, and to those who had federal crop insurance in 1989. The five 
specific levels of payments were set as follows: 
a. Those in federal programs and with crop insurance would receive 65% of the 
target price on all crop losses greater than 35% of their normal production. 
b. Those in federal programs but without crop insurance would receive payment 
for all crops when the loss exceeded 40% (not 35%) as above. 
c. Soybean growers (not a program crop) would get 65% of the target price 
when their crop losses exceeded 45%. 
d. Producers of non-program crops would get 65% of target prices if losses 
exceeded 50%. 
e. Farmers who produce program crops but did not participate during 1989 
would get 65% target price with losses greater than 50%. 
The bill importantly allowed for losses regardless of whether it was due to the drought or 
because of the extremely wet conditions that also developed in 1989. 
President Bush signed the 1989 Farm Relief Act into law on August 15, almost exactly 
a year after President Reagan signed the 1988 Farm Relief Act. However, the 1989 Relief 
Act provided approximately $1 billion for assistance, only 25% of the $4 billion provided in 
1988. This is one measure of the difference in the drought impacts between the two years. 
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SUMMARY 
In conclusion, the federal policy conflicts centered around several issues. The first 
involved differences within Congress and also between some members of Congress and the 
Administration. It concerned the use of drought relief versus use of the all-weather peril 
insurance program. Earlier agreements had broken down on this question essentially 
because farmers had not widely used the insurance program. This attitude had been further 
enhanced by the issuance of sizable farm relief payments in 1988. 
The second issue concerned interest in the provision of major federal relief assistance 
for spring crop and livestock problems. This included, during the spring of 1989, a 
difference with the Administration providing relief for livestock growers (which of course did 
not involve financial resources) versus not wanting to provide financial relief for the wheat 
farmers, an interesting contrast. In both cases, there were regional interests during the 
spring of 1989 combatting the so-called "national interest," both in Congress and in the 
Administration. 
The third issue and most critical area concerned how to provide relief payments for 
all crop losses in 1989. The questions debated included whether to rewrite a new generic 
relief act for 1989 or to extend the 1988 Farm Relief Act with more funds, waiting to be 
more sure of the extent of loss after harvest. A central question focused on what crops to 
cover in the 1989 Relief Act, just wheat (initially), then just government program crops, and 
then all other damaged crops (Farm Week, July 3). This issue also dealt with crop problems 
stemming from too much precipitation found in the south (rice and cotton) and in the 
eastern Corn Belt. 
The government handling of the drought (and the other weather extremes) of 1989 
revealed other major interesting policy issues and their causes. It was obvious that the 
expectations and monitoring for the drought of 1989 were inadequate, as in 1988. Great 
uncertainty was presented about the status of the drought by meteorologists over whether 
the drought would continue, redevelop, or terminate in 1989, and if present, how severe it 
might become. These issues, coupled with constant uncertainties about the dimension of 
drought's effects on crop production were important in causing conflict within Congress and 
Administration over how to address and manage the drought problems. 
Another interesting aspect of agricultural policy revealed in the government actions 
includes an interesting shift in Administrative attitudes. During the spring of 1989, the views 
of the Administration, expressed largely through the USDA, were ones of cautious optimism 
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about no drought in 1989 with a tone of downplaying its potential, particularly of loss to 
summer crops. As conditions worsened during May, June, and July, the position of the 
USDA shifted from relative optimism to realism with admissions by July that the nation not 
only had drought damage to the winter wheat crops of the High Plains, by then to corn and 
soybeans in the western Corn Belt, and then to spring wheat in the northern High Plains. 
The USDA announced by late August that "lingering drought" had continued to reduce crop 
production and reduce U.S. grain reserves (News Gazette, August 25b). Reasons for the 
earlier optimistic outlook could be credited to several factors including wanting to present 
a bright outlook about future U.S. grain exports to foreign users, and to a general sense of 
optimism around a new crop year, plus use of long-range weather outlooks that downplayed 
and underestimated the dimensions of the continuing spring and summer 1989 drought. 
Importantly, the agricultural reactions to the drought of 1989 that affected the winter 
wheat producers, the livestock and hog producers, and then the corn, soybean, and spring 
wheat producers, again reflected a total focus in the Administration and in Congress of 
"crisis management of drought." The lessons of 1988 had not been learned. The need to 
establish and maintain a high-level Administration Task Force on Drought had not been 
realized in 1988, and if such a group had been present it might have alleviated certain of the 
agricultural problems. 
Another issue that began to appear along with the drought problems of 1989 related 
to future agricultural policies. The new (1990) Farm Bill which will be constructed during 
the next 12 months (post August-1989) will contain many controversial issues. One of those 
created by the drought of 1988 and 1989 is related to the issue of use of crop insurance 
versus disaster relief (Farm Week, July 3). The Illinois Farm Bureau suggested that all 
insurance be moved to the private sector. Another future policy issue from the drought of 
1989 will be the corn set-aside levels. The USDA announced (Farm Week, July 24c) that 
the maximum value in 1990 would be less than 12.5% (it was 10% in 1989). Importantly, 
on July 3, 1989, the USDA had forecast a set-aside in 1990 greater than 12.5% of lands in 
corn, but this had shifted by late July (with new and larger crop loss estimates) to less than 
12.5%. 
Another area of national policy effects ensuing from the droughts of 1988 and 1989 
(and possible future drought), relates to national grain surpluses with their great importance 
to U.S. commerce and to global food supplies. The USDA's 1988-89 policy relating to U.S. 
grain production and surpluses, including exports in 1989, was based on a "non-drought" 
scenario for 1989. As noted, it was essentially optimistic and based on an expectation that 
the weather would return the U.S. to "normal agricultural production." It did not and the 
temporal differences in the USDA's expectations for corn production and surpluses are 
revealed in Table 2 below. 
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Table 2. USDA Estimates of 1989 corn crop and available surpluses. 
Fall 1988 March 1, 1989 July 1, 1989 August 1, 1989 
Production (billions 
bushels) 
- 7.85 7.45 7.35 
Acres (millions acres) - 73.3 727 65.15 
Yield (bushels/acre) - 114 113 112.8 
Stocks (billions of 
bushels) 
4.25 2.0(1) 2.83(1) 1.68(1) 
(1)Expected by Fall of 1989 
This reveals how the expectations for production and in turn surpluses rapidly fell. To 
interpret the surpluses and production figures, note that the U.S. annually utilizes 7 billion 
bushels of corn. 
Wheat production also fell with winter wheat yields reduced 35% in Kansas and 
Nebraska and spring wheat reduced by drought in the Dakotas and Montana. The 1988 
drought brought U.S. production down to 1.81 billion bushels, and end of August estimates 
for 1989 indicate 2.04 billion bushels for 1989 (News Gazette, August 25b). This compares 
to annual usage of 2.3 billion bushels. Exports will fall by 10% and predicted U.S. stockpiles 
on June 1, 1990 are for 474 million bushels, the lowest since 1975. The world's stocks of 
wheat are now the lowest since 1975. 
Several events, and some foreseeable, occurred to defeat the USDA's optimistic 
expectations for 1989 weather and crop yields by the USDA. First, the drought in the 
western Corn Belt was sufficiently severe, coupled with the loss of deep soil moisture due 
to the drought in 1988, to lead to severe crop conditions and one that was climatically 
predictable by January 1. Climatological probabilistic outlooks from NOAA issued in 
December 1988 indicated that this area had only one chance in 100 of escaping drought 
during the first 6 months of 1989. Second, Corn Belt farmers who were inherently aware 
of their low soil moisture carryover, tended to plant lower (less dense) stands than average 
and this decreased in-field yields. Third, the extreme wetness and low temperatures in 
spring and June in eastern Indiana and Ohio decreased the USDA's expected increases in 
planted acreage for 1989. Following the 1988 drought and the low production, coupled with 
the relaxation of the set-aside lands restrictions to 10%, USDA expected to get increased 
national production. However, increased planting was not as great as expected, due to the 
wetness in the eastern Corn Belt, and due to the fact that many farmers simply could not 
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afford to increase planting due to their low income from 1988. Fourth, corn yields were hurt 
throughout the Corn Belt by "carryover problems" from herbicides used on soybeans in 1988. 
The low rainfall of 1988 caused these herbicides to remain in the soil and these in turn 
damaged the 1989 corn (Farm Week, July 3). 
Although the national soybean surpluses were relatively lower by the end of 1988 than 
were corn (3 months supply), the production and surplus supply problems of soybeans during 
1989 were less than corn for three reasons. First, the hot, dry conditions in the western 
Corn Belt that affected corn in June and July did not affect bean plants as much as corn. 
Second, farmers unable to plant corn in the eastern Corn Belt because of the wetness, 
shifted to beans because they were a later plant crop. Finally, Brazil had a very large 
soybean crop during 1988-1989 and this production helped provide an abnormally large 
percent of global bean needs, reducing the demands on U.S. production. 
TRANSPORTATION 
A major impact of the 1988 drought, with greatly reduced streamflows on the Ohio 
and lower Mississippi Rivers, was to impede and reduce transportation by barges. These 
effects were primarily during June, July, and August 1988, and they were associated with 
shifts in shipping to certain railroads. A major beneficiary in 1988 was the Illinois Central 
Railroad which has north-south connections between Chicago and New Orleans, primary 
ports for export shipments of corn and soybean meal (News Gazette, March 5d). These 
problems led to adjustments and to careful monitoring and predictions about river 
transportation conditions in 1989. 
On January 21, Arthur Daniel Midlands (ADM), one of the nation's primary grain 
handling companies, purchased 14.6% of the Illinois Central Railroad at a price of $36 
million (News Gazette, January 21a). The action was credited to the effects of the drought. 
ADM is a major shipper of grain and grain products and owns a grain-hauling barge . 
company operating on the Mississippi River system. This action was reportedly aimed at 
giving it greater transportation versatility. 
It was announced in early March that the railroads had moved 4.9% more carloads 
of grain in 1988 than they had in 1987 (News Gazette, March 5d). The Illinois Central 
Railroad had 40,000 more carloads handled during the last 7 months of 1989 due to drought. 
However, the barge problems of 1988 had hurt certain area railroads such as the CM&W 
and Norfolk Southern Corporation which primarily serve as feeder lines to the barge ports. 
A problem facing both the railroads and barge companies in 1989 was the decreased U.S. 
grain stocks (used in 1988 to meet U.S. exports demands) and lowered winter wheat yields. 
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Collectively, this meant reduced shipping. 
On March 1 the National Weather Service announced that the Mississippi River level 
at Memphis was up, ranking as the highest level in four years (News Gazette, March 1). 
They also announced that the Missouri River was low and was already negatively affecting 
the movement of barge traffic. In early March, the American Waterway Operators 
Association indicated optimism for average barge shipments in 1989, an action attempting 
to positively affect plans of various shippers (the waterways versus railways issue). The 
Association had estimated their 1988 losses at $200 million during 1988, but chose not to 
pursue a definitive follow-up analysis of actual losses in 1989 (News Gazette, March 5d). 
Examples of changes in costs for shipping were provided for a major river port along 
the Illinois River at Ottawa, Illinois. The cost of shipping a bushel of corn from Ottawa to 
New Orleans was 19 cents in 1987, but in 1988 it was increased to 46 cents per bushel. 
Illinois grain shippers were optimistic about good river transport conditions throughout 1989. 
The optimism was being generated by the high flows of the Ohio River, a result of heavy 
spring and June rainfall in Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee. However, on May 1, the 
Missouri River flows were still well below average and it was announced that navigation on 
that river would be curtailed during 1989 (UPI, May 1). Figure 3 reveals the extent of 
severe drought conditions covered 44% of the Mississippi River Basin during May 1989, and 
this was the fourth largest drought in May since 1895 (only Mays in 1931,1934, and 1954 
exceeded 1989). 
Optimism over river transport turned to pessimism by late May. On May 29, the 
USDA announced that reduced flows on the Mississippi River would cause bottlenecks for 
grain shipment by early fall of 1989 (News Gazette, May 29). The Missouri River levels 
during January-April 1989 and those on the lower Mississippi were well below those of 1988 
for the same period. By the end of April, the Mississippi River level at St. Louis was 13.5 
feet, 6 feet below its average. 
By August 1, grain prices were down and grain stocks in the central U.S. were largely 
depleted. Barge shipping rates had been reduced below profit-making levels and 20% of 
all barges were not in use. The Mississippi River near St. Louis was sufficiently low to 
provide occasional problems for barge movements. The central Mississippi and Illinois 
Rivers were both low and very dependent on frequent summer rains to sustain sufficient flow 
for barges. The prolonged drought led the Corps of Engineers (COE) to decide to close 
navigation on the Missouri River one month early (on November 1, 1989), and the COE 
further announced that reservoir levels (in the basin) would be lower at the end of 1989 than 
the end of 1988 (UPI, August 10). 
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WATER SUPPLIES 
As the United States entered 1989, water supply drought concerns were evident (see 
Fig. 1c) in the northeast (Pennsylvania, Delaware, New Jersey, New York, and north to 
Maine); in the western Corn Belt; and in California-Nevada (News Gazette, February 6). 
Deficient precipitation in the northeastern United States during the winter of 1989 
increased concerns in that area (News Day, May 2). The Delaware River Basin Commission 
issued a drought warning on January 17, automatically reducing the amount of water that 
northern and central New Jersey could withdraw from the basin. Then, a drought watch was 
adopted in the New York metropolitan area (Northeast Regional Climate Center, March 
1989). Reports from the Susquehanna River Basin in central Pennsylvania indicated that 
state officials found serious ground water deficiencies and declared a drought watch. On 
April 1, the mayor of New York announced a drought emergency, setting strict limits on 
business water use. Heavy precipitation began falling in late April throughout the 
northeastern United States (Northeast Regional Climate Center, July 1989). Several New 
York area reservoirs were 80 to 100% filled by mid-May, and the water supply drought 
conditions of the northeast were alleviated (News Day, May 2). Several areas received from 
120 to 155% of normal precipitation during the late spring, and by June no drought was 
present as shown in Figure 1d (Heim, 1989). 
The water supply (hydrologic) drought in the Midwest was severe in the summer of 
1988 and continued to be severe in northern Missouri, southern Iowa, and western Illinois 
during early 1989 (Los Angeles Times, May 14). Some problems related to expanded 
irrigation in Illinois during 1988 which had depleted ground water reservoirs (News Gazette, 
January 21c). The acreage irrigated in Illinois expanded by 15% in 1988 and led to local 
controversies over water pollution due to refiltration of farm herbicides, pesticides, and 
fertilizer. 
Water supply problems deepened during the late spring, particularly in northern 
Missouri and Iowa. Several communities in northern Missouri reported water supply 
shortages by May 1 as well as problems with rural water supplies (UPI, May 1). Iowa 
communities and farmers were short of water (Washington Post, May 21). Several Illinois 
water supply systems which had experienced difficulties in meeting needs during the 1988 
summer period, announced plans to develop new filtration systems, to enlarge storage, and 
to extend water lines (News Gazette, May 4). By the end of June 1989, three Illinois 
communities were still rationing water (Illinois Water Survey, July 1). These problems 
continued through the summer (News Gazette, August 20). 
In Iowa, April newspaper headlines effectively proclaimed that "the drought of 1988 
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continues" (Los Angeles Times, April 14). Numerous ground water problems were noted, 
and water was being hauled by the National Guard to nine Iowa communities during April, 
May, and June. The Iowa legislature voted funds to help in developing pumping stations to 
help alleviate livestock water shortages. Communities in Missouri were in trouble and were 
seeking new sources while using severe conservation (UPI, May 1). Missouri communities 
continued to have problems throughout the summer and farmers were driving up to 100 
miles daily in July to obtain water for their cattle (UPI, July 23). 
The more severe 1989 drought area in the High Plains occurred in areas that were 
not in severe agricultural drought in 1988. In 1989, Kansas, Nebraska, and Colorado (see 
Figs. 5-6) were hard hit, as opposed to the Dakotas and Montana being the hardest hit in 
1988. The 1989 drought in the central and southern High Plains also affected water supplies 
for livestock, children, and crop producers. The dryness led to very slow growth of pastures, 
requiring use of supplemental feed. In some areas, livestock water supplies were very short, 
and livestock producers were selling cow-calf pairs at above normal rates in spring (Financial 
Times, May 19). 
Agricultural irrigation, which is widely practiced in many of the 1989 drought affected 
areas of the High Plains, was impacted by the 1988 and 1989 droughts. Producers with 
sprinkler irrigation watered their crops prior to fall emergence, a very unusual practice, in 
an effort to provide water then lacking in the topsoil for the winter wheat. Nebraska 
estimates placed 1989 irrigation costs at least 10% above those of 1988 (High Plains Climate 
Center, May 1989). 
The drought in the far west was severe during 1987-88 in portions of California and 
the northwest (News Gazette, February 26). Generally deficient precipitation during the 
1988-89 winter, particularly in Nevada and central-southern California, helped sustain 
drought-like conditions in those areas (Fig. 4). Growing precipitation deficiencies, coupled 
with above normal temperatures elsewhere in the southwestern United States (Arizona, New 
Mexico, Utah, Colorado) brought ever deepening drought conditions during the spring and 
early summer of 1989 (Fig. 1d), (Christian Science Monitor, June 2, and CAC, May 1989). 
Storms in March dramatically improved northern California's water supply outlook, 
and federal and state agencies lifted many water delivery restrictions in April. Yet, 1989 
streamflow volumes were expected to be about 75% of average in the central and northern 
Sierras and only 50% of normal in the south. 
Portions of the northern Great Basin continued to experience a third year of deficient 
water conditions (Western Regional Climate Center, August 1989). The spring of 1989 had 
below average runoff as mountain snowpacks were quickly removed as a result of very high 
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temperatures in April. The northern third of Utah experienced extreme drought conditions 
during the spring of 1989, and municipal water supplies became quite low with many Nevada 
reservoirs being at or below 50% of average. 
Thus, during the 6-month period of January-June 1989, the water supply drought in 
the United States deepened in the southwestern United States, covering an area bounded 
by central California, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, and areas southward and westward (see Fig. 
1d). Water supplies in the Missouri River Basin were also deficient (CAC, July 1989), 
affecting river transport as well as water supply at several communities, with shortages at 
rural sites in the High Plains and western Corn Belt (News Gazette, May 29). Water supply 
conditions were average or above elsewhere in the United States (CAC, May 1989). 
The agricultural and water supply droughts by September 1989 included: 1) areas 
in the west central Corn Belt; 2) areas in the northern and central Great Plains; and 3) most 
of the southwestern United States including the Great Basin, the southern half of California, 
and Arizona and western New Mexico. The major U.S. drought that began in 1987 was well 
developed and in its third year. 
ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS 
One of the greatest areas of speculation about effects of the drought of 1988 was in 
the area of the natural environment. Considerable concern had been expressed in 1988 
about long-term effects to private and public forests, to water quality, and to fish and 
wildlife. Unfortunately, these effects in many cases were not well monitored during 1988 and 
were only being crudely estimated. Many relationships between extreme weather conditions 
like droughts and parts of the natural ecosystem are poorly understood, and in general, 
effects could not be adequately assessed during 1988. However, various impacts and 
adjustments relating to environmental effects became more apparent during the winter and 
spring of 1989. The 1988 fires in Yellowstone Park had been excessive and their 
management became a national issue. Adequate 1989 rainfall had helped regenerate growth 
in the Park (News Gazette, August 30a), but debates over how to manage the U.S. forest 
resources continued (Conniff, 1989). 
One sign of effects in 1989 occurred in January when the state of Missouri restricted 
its duck hunting season and areas, detrimentally affecting its tourist industry, to protect the 
reduced number of ducks (News Gazette, January 21b). A major article in Sports Illustrated 
(March 13) entitled, "A Climate for Death," reported on various impacts including very 
negative effects on wildlife populations including turtles and ducks (in the northern 
75 
Midwest), with populations of ducks down 38% on the Pacific flyway. Reports of decreases 
in the buffalo and elk herds of the northern Rockies were also provided. 
Another environmental effect was predicted in mid-April 1989. This was for 
increased pest populations during the spring and summer of 1989 due partly to the 1988 
drought, as well as to the mild winter and low snowcover in the Midwest (Chicago Tribune, 
April 16). Also, winter kill of evergreens was increased partly as a result of the drought, 
with an increase in canker disease which attacks the stems of woody plants and trees (News 
Gazette, June 10). The summer of 1989 produced sizable Midwestern and northern 
mosquito populations, seen as a result of the 1988 drought (News Gazette, June 28). Fears 
of an increase in encephalitis caused by the large mosquito population also appeared (News 
Gazette, August 30b). 
Assessors announced in May that there was considerable shrub and tree damage 
across the Midwest as a result of the 1988 dryness (UPI, May 8). The health of many plants 
had been weakened by the drought, plus by the wide temperature swings of the 1988-1989 
winter. Young fruit trees, 1 to 2 years old, were noted to be dying in orchards across 
western Michigan, resulting in the loss of millions of dollars (UPI, May 8). 
The drought of 1988 resulted in enormous wildfires across the central basin and 
Pacific northwest. Controversies raged over the amount of environmental and economic 
damage to public and private forests, but the damage was very large. The sustained dryness 
of 1988-89 in parts of California, Oregon, Idaho, and Wyoming, plus new and deepening 
drought in Utah, Colorado, Nebraska, Arizona, and New Mexico a (9-state area) led to an 
early resumption of wildfires in late June 1989 (News Gazette, July 8). By July 10, 1989, 44 
wildfires were burning uncontrolled and two persons had been killed (News Gazette, July 
11). Nearly 40 homes were destroyed in Colorado and fires raged over 200,000 acres by 
mid-July (News Gazette, July 12). 
Fire problems continued into August. By August 1, 20,000 fire fighters were dealing 
with fires in Idaho, Washington, Oregon, and California, and a reported 175,000 acres had 
been burned in these four states (News Gazette, August 2). After a short period of cool 
weather which aided fire fighting in certain regions in early August, fires had also spread in 
Montana. Severe fires in the Boise National Forest were being fought, and it was reported 
that $36 million had been lost in the forestry sources there (News Gazette, August 4a). By 
August 5, 225,000 acres of fires were burning, and there had already been 1.4 million acres 
burned (News Gazette, August 6). Army troops had been added to the fire fighting force, 
bringing the total to 23,000. 
Soil erosion had been increased by the spring drought. Windblown erosion was 
76 
reported to be the worst since 1954 (News Gazette, June 20). The 1989 drought, centered 
in the western U.S., provided major problems for water resources and the environment. 
HUMAN HEALTH 
One of the major impacts of the 1988 drought and the associated heat wave during 
June, July, and August 1988, were the impacts of human health. It was estimated that 
approximately 5,000 died from the extreme heat, and many of these deaths occurred in 
major metropolitan areas in the central and northeastern U.S. 
During the summer of 1989, temperatures across the Midwest and Northeast were 
generally near average, and although there were periods of extremely high temperatures, the 
number of days with temperatures in excess of 90°F were not excessive. This tended to 
minimize health impacts from high temperatures, as well as to help lessen the effects of the 
below normal precipitation on agriculture and water supplies. However, it should be noted 
that temperatures in the southwestern states were much above average throughout the 
spring and summer of 1989. 
Temperatures in the Midwest during July 1989 became excessive. Prolonged above 
average temperatures during the first half of July led to illness and deaths. By July 10, three 
cities (Chicago, Cincinnati, and St. Louis) had opened a city-wide series of "cool centers" 
(AP, July 11b). On July 11, three persons died of heat in St. Louis, bringing a total there 
of 6 versus 25 at that time during July 1988 (AP, July 12b). High temperatures later in July 
were also evident along the east coast. Boston opened 24 cool shelters, the Northeast Power 
Pool set records for usage, and a heat alert was established in New England (UPI, July 27). 
It appeared that greater attention was being given in 1989 to alerting urban citizens to heat 
threats and the availability of cool centers than had occurred during 1988, suggesting a lesson 
that had been learned. 
DROUGHT MONITORING, UNDERSTANDING, AND PREDICTIONS 
One of the interesting aspects of the 1988 drought concerned problems over the 
availability of weather/drought information, and the pronouncements of scientists about the 
causes of the drought and its status. Information relating to the drought and its seriousness 
had been notably tardy in issuance in 1988. There were also claims and debates about 
whether the drought of 1988 had been caused by the long-predicted climate change due to 
the Greenhouse Effect. As will be shown, scientists continued in 1989 to provide widely 
differing views of the 1989 drought including its causes, severity, and possible termination. 
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In January 1989, a national news story indicated that the scientists had "agreed" that 
the drought of 1988 was not due to the Greenhouse effect (News Gazette, January 5). At 
a major national scientific meeting in January, other scientists announced there had been $40 
million losses due to the drought of 1988 (San Francisco Chronicle, January 21). They 
claimed that the U.S. response to the drought was poor, and called for the U.S. to develop 
plans for continuing drought in 1989 (an action which had not occurred, St. Louis Post 
Dispatch, January 23). 
Congress get in the impact monitoring issue early with Congressman De la Garza 
announcing (on February 2) that critical drought conditions still existed in the U.S. (News 
Gazette, February 2). NOAA's Climate Analysis Center had announced on January 29 that 
a severe drought was still present in the Great Plains and the western Midwest (San 
Francisco Chronicle, January 29). Another scientist proclaimed in January the high 
likelihood of a water supply drought in the west (St. Louis Dispatch, January 23). Events 
later in 1989 proved these predictions to be correct. A major news story issued on February 
6 presented a national analysis of drought conditions for major U.S. areas. This indicated 
that the southwestern U.S. had experienced a warm and dry winter affecting insect 
populations and the winter wheat crop, and the western Corn Belt (Iowa, Missouri, and 
western Illinois) was dry as was the west, California and Nevada. However, USDA 
meteorologists indicated great improvement in drought conditions since 1988 (News Gazette, 
February 6). 
Five days later, a climatologist announced that soil moisture in Illinois would recharge 
and that a 1989 drought in Illinois would be unlikely (News Gazette, February 11). On 
February 20, the senior meteorologist of the USDA announced that there would be "no 
serious drought in 1989" (News Gazette, February 20). This forecast failed. 
At that time (late February), it was clear that moderate to severe drought existed in 
several parts of the nation (see Fig. 1c). The Climate Analysis Center (March 1, 1989) 
issued the first drought monitoring report for 1989 and it depicted widespread drought. 
however, some weather experts were proclaiming that the drought was not going to last, nor 
be on the scale of the 1988 drought. On March 3, a NOAA scientist proclaimed the 
likelihood for continued drought in California (News Gazette, March 3). Illinois scientists 
further predicted on March 5 that the drought of Illinois in 1989 was "unlikely" with 
continued improvements in soil moisture (News Gazette, March 5f). This openly 
contradicted a news story on March 4 indicating that soil moisture in western Illinois was less 
than existed in 1988, leading to more midwestern confusion (News Gazette, March 4). 
On April 10, USDA's Chief Meteorologist announced it was premature to decide 
there would be a severe drought in 1989, indicating that "weather patterns of 1989 are 
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different and better (less drought-like) than those in 1988" (Reuters, April 10). The crop 
effects of the extreme temperature differences occurring during the winter of 1988-89 did 
not appear to be accounted for in the assessment of drought in 1989. 
On April 14, Iowa scientists indicated that drought conditions in their state were 
serious; that Iowa had never recovered from the 1988 drought, and that there was a major 
drought "pocket" existing across most of Iowa, western Illinois, northern Missouri, and 
southern Minnesota, and Wisconsin (Los Angeles Times, April 14). Weather scientists in 
these five states all agreed on the seriousness of the drought in this area. These views 
conflicted with the optimistic outlook by some weathermen at the national level. 
This confusion of views by weather scientists, partly due to statements concerning 
areas of different scale (national vs. regional) was apparent to farmers and agribusinesses. 
It further eroded the credibility of the pronouncements of the atmospheric scientists. This 
helped feed the volatile weather market previously described (AP, May 1). 
On April 26, USDA's Chief Meteorologist again issued an "optimistic" outlook on 
U.S. drought conditions (Reuters, April 26). He specifically indicated optimism about 
prospects for the crops that would be planted in the spring of 1989. (One could no longer 
be optimistic about the winter wheat crop, at least that in the Great Plains.) However, on 
May 2, a National Weather Service forecaster stated the spring outlook did not look good 
for ending the drought (News Day, May 2), a position in conflict with the USDA statements 
issued 6 days earlier. The second drought advisory of NOAA revealed an enlarging drought 
in the U.S. (CAC, May 1989), as revealed it figure 2. 
Many local and regional stories analyzing the drought continued to be issued in May. 
On May 2, a national news release presented an analysis by several scientists about the cause 
of the 1988 drought (News Day, May 2). It concluded that the drought was not related to 
the Greenhouse Effect or to climate change. 
Iowa scientists then announced, on May 8, that early May rains had helped some in 
Iowa, but that 90% of Iowa had less than adequate subsoil moisture and 32% less moisture 
in the top soils than needed and that drought would occur (UPI, May 8). In early May, an 
Illinois scientist indicated that drought was present across the northern third of Illinois (News 
Gazette, May 2). On May 11, High Plains scientists predicted the drought would continue 
in Kansas and the other parts of the High Plains (News Gazette, May 11). Climatologists 
in Michigan predicted on May 17 that there would be more drought in the Midwest during 
1989 (UPI, May 17). Several scientists indicated that atmospheric patterns in 1989 were 
different than those in 1988, but disagreed over what the outcome would be for drought 
placement or intensity in 1989 (New York Times, May 16). 
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USDA meteorologists admitted that the drought in the High Plains was serious (UPI, 
May 18). They further proclaimed on May 21 that agricultural drought prospects for 1989 
summer crops were still small, but announced that water supply (ground water) drought 
would persist during 1989 in certain areas (Washington Post, May 21). Illinois weather 
scientists continued to vacillate on drought prospects indicating it was unlikely in May (News 
Gazette, May 29), and then in June indicating that it would persist (News Gazette, June 19). 
The Illinois continuing drought situation was further reinforced by an announcement in early 
July that the drought was still present in northern Illinois (UPI, July 7b). 
Scientists reawakened the drought-Greenhouse debates in July, with Washington-
based scientists indicating that in 1989 there had been many weather extremes, and 
speculating that these were related to the Greenhouse Effect (News Gazette, July 15). A 
month later, an Iowa scientist announced the 1988-1989 drought was due to cyclical behavior 
of the climate caused by many factors (Farm Week, August 28c). He and another scientist 
provided long-range outlooks of weather into the 1990s that disagreed as to what would 
occur (Farm Week, August 28a). 
Scientists increasingly addressed the extent of the 1989 drought during mid-July 
indicating that its dimensions included the western Corn Belt, High Plains, and Southwestern 
Untied States, and indicating the drought was bad but not as bad as 1988 (Los Angeles 
Times, July 16). USDA meteorologists also spoke to this issue in August indicating that 
there was great uncertainty over the causes of climate change (Farm Week, August 7b). 
The third drought advisory of 1989 portrayed continuing severe drought over nearly 40% of 
the U.S. (CAC, July 1989). 
The summer of 1989 with its drought problems in the western Corn Belt and central-
northern High Plains, and overly wet conditions in the eastern Corn Belt, ended with 
scientists predicting a new problem — early frost. Two private meteorologists issued late 
August predictions of early frost which would hurt the late maturing grain crops (Farm 
Week, August 28a and b). 
Thus, the scientific assessments and pronouncements about the causes of drought, the 
presence and severity of drought, and the future of drought in 1989 (and 1990) offered a 
wide variety of contrasts and conflicting scientific options, as they had in 1988. This led to 
uncertainty amongst resource managers and policy makers ("who does one believe?"). 
Farmers in Illinois suffering from drought in late August 1989 openly complained about 
earlier 1989 forecasts that indicated a 1989 drought was unlikely (Farm Week, August 21a). 
The National Climatic Data Center had issued (in December 1988) a climate-based 
outlook for conditions during January-June 1989. The outlook indicated the precipitation 
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needed to end the drought, plus the probabilities based on historical data, of receiving 
sufficient precipitation to end the drought. Maps of these are portrayed in figure 10a and 
10b. Figure 10c presents the actual precipitation, expressed as percent of average, received 
during January-June 1989 in the central U.S. This shows that the driest area, that with less 
than 80%, exists where the probabilities indicated drought was likely to persist during the 
first 6 months of 1989. A few areas with a 1-in-10 chance in Indiana and Ohio did get 
sufficient rain (>20 inches) to escape from drought. All Midwestern areas with only 1% 
chance of drought termination remained in drought. Inspection of figure 9c reveals the 
summer continuance of drought in the severe areas predicted for January-June. The 
important point is that climate-based outlooks issued in 1988 of conditions 6 months ahead 
were capable of estimating the continuation of drought in most regions of the central U.S. 
Unfortunately, few decision makers were aware of this and several forecasters issued 
predictions during spring that disagreed with these climate-based outlooks. 
FURTHER ASSESSMENTS OF LOSSES FROM THE 1988 DROUGHT 
Several assessments of the economic effects, as well as environmental effects, of the 
1988 drought were made in 1988. These, of necessity, consisted of early estimates. With the 
passage of time, better estimates of the losses and costs became available. 
On January 9, the USDA indicated that the corn losses from the 1988 drought were 
slightly less than expected (News Gazette, January 10). In November they had estimated 
1988 corn production at 4.9 billion bushels, but the January final figure was 5.5 billion 
bushels of corn, still 30% less than in 1987. The yields of soybeans nationally were 1.5 
billion bushels, with no change from their November estimates, but down 20% from 1987. 
At a national scientific conference, scientists assessing the 1988 drought reported that 
national drought losses amounted to nearly $40 million and that the U.S. response to the 
drought had been generally crisis management and often ineffective (St. Louis Post Dispatch, 
January 23). 
By early March, it was apparent that the national sales of weather insurance were 
going to be much greater than in 1988 (News Gazette, March 4). The increased sales were 
100 to 200% more in parts of the central United States. 
On March 4, the USDA indicated that the national surplus of corn would be 1.7 
billion bushels, greatly reduced from the 4.9 billions bushels in 1986 (News Gazette, March 
4). The soybean surplus in March was 140 million bushels, as compared to 536 million 
bushels in 1986. However, great attention was paid to the fact that more acres were being 
planted in both crops in 1989. USDA expected an 8 to 12% increase in planted corn 
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acreage in 1989 due to removal of set-aside restrictions (News Gazette, March 4). This was 
not accomplished due to the wet spring conditions in the eastern Corn Belt (UPI, June 16). 
Final grain production figures for the United States in 1988 were issued on April 7, 
indicating an overall 26% reduction. The amount of acres in corn, as assessed in June, was 
1.5 to 2 million acres less than the USDA had forecast (73.3 million acres in March, Farm 
Week, June 26b). 
Figure 10. Climate-based probabilities for January-June 1989 precipitation in the Midwest and 
the actual precipitation received, as the percent of average (National Climatic Data Center). 
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Continuing effects of the 1988 drought, and partially integrated with the 1989 effects, 
were being realized during July and August 1989. The USDA announced that U.S. supplies 
were at the "comfortable level" (Bureau of National Affairs, July 5). The status on national 
crop supplies were announced as follows: corn down 41% from 1988; old wheat down 45% 
from 1988 (and the lowest since 1976); soybeans down 29% from 1988; sorghum down 31% 
from 1988; barley down 39% from 1988; and oats down 12%. Secretary of Agriculture 
indicated that the U.S. had three months supply of wheat and that production would be 
sufficient to meet our export demands. The USDA also indicated that "these higher than 
expected inventories of grain during mid-1989" should help reverse the recent increases in 
food costs. The annual corn use is 7 billion bushels and the U.S. had 4.25 billion in the fall 
of 1988 (302 billion soybean) and this was now predicted to fall to 2 billion bushels of corn 
in the fall of 1989 (125 billion bushels of soybeans). This latter projection was based on an 
outlook in 1989 of 7.85 billion bushels produced of corn. 
On April 13, the USDA announced that the total farm aid provided under the 1988 
Relief Act was then $3.2 billion with North Dakota receiving the largest amount, $389 
million. Ninety percent of the aid paid was for crop losses, and the rest for livestock (UPI, 
April 13). The detrimental effects of the drought caused between 10,000 and 15,000 farmers 
to go bankrupt. On May 8, USDA reported that the drought aid related to 1988 losses had 
reached $3.5 billion nearly reaching the $3.9 billion allowed under the 1988 Relief Act (UP, 
May 8). North Dakota with $402 million in aid was first, followed by Illinois with $368 
million, Iowa with $315 million, Wisconsin with $357 million, and Minnesota- with $308 
million. The total number of farmers who were recipients of aid had grown to 736,220. The 
1988 payout reached $3.71 billion by early June 1989, and five states had received half the 
aid (UPI, June 8). By early July the 1988 drought relief had been extended to 790,000 
farmers and totaled $3.78 billion (UPI, July 7a). Secretary Yuetter announced on July 16 
that the drought in 1988, even with $4 billion in relief payments, had saved $6.5 billion 
because of the reductions in crop deficiency payments (Farm Week, July 17a). The 1988 
aid level reached $3.84 billion by early August 1989 with aid given to 800,048 farmers (UPI, 
August 4). 
Problems with the winter wheat crop of 1988-89 led to early expectations for $1 
billion additional relief to be paid in 1989. Expectations for the total U.S. 1989 wheat crop 
(issued May 11, 1989) was 8% lower than that in 1988, with expectations that wheat exports 
would decline by 300 million bushels in the year beginning June 1, 1989. Crop problems 
related to the western Corn Belt and northern High Plains, coupled with overly wet 
conditions in the east and south led to the enactment of a 1989 agricultural relief bill on 
August 15 for $900 million to farmers with losses to any crops. 
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The USDA announced in late May that food prices in 1989 would be up 5.5 to 6% 
above those in 1988 (AP, June 3). This level was much higher than the USDA forecast 
issued in November 1988 for 3 to 5% increases. There was great concern over the increased 
costs to the beef industry due to the higher cost of feeding livestock and the difficulty in 
pasturelands. However, a national economic analysis of the effects of 1989 drought to winter 
wheat and livestock producers concluded that the broad effect would be negligible and 
possibly even beneficial to the U.S. consumer (U.S. News and World Report, May 15). The 
conclusion that the wheat losses would not increase food costs was based on a belief that the 
livestock problems would reduce beef prices, compensating for increased costs due to grains. 
Wisconsin analysts concluded that the rise in food costs in that state had risen 8.7% as a 
result of the drought (UPI, July 31). 
Economists in analyzing the 1988 drought, concluded that the drought had dampened 
economic growth in the United States (Lebham-Friedman, May 8). This was reflected in 
the fact that personal income had increased by 6.5% in 1988 being 0.5% less than 1987 
(7.0%) due to drought. They predicted that the cumulative effects of the drought of 1988 
and 1989 would dampen personal income growth even more in 1989. Industry is cited as 
being particularly impacted by the 1988-1989 drought included food processing firms, 
electrical machinery manufacturers, and non-electric machinery industries. 
CONCLUSIONS 
As in 1988, the most important follow-on impacts of the 1988 drought, and the most 
important impacts during the first nine months of 1989 from the "1989 drought," were to the 
agricultural sector. The 1989 drought in the central High Plains and western Corn Belt 
provided two major negative impacts, one to the winter wheat belt centered in Kansas, and 
the other to livestock producers in the High Plains and western Corn Belts. Rises in food 
prices in 1989 due to drought became double (7% vs. 3%) that predicted by USDA in 
November 1988. Ripple effects from the 1988 drought were still being felt in the 
midwestern Corn and Soybean Belt and to various agribusinesses involved in selling 
equipment, fertilizer, and insurance for the 1989 crop season. The 1988 drought continued 
up through the summer of 1989 in the western Corn Belt and northern High Plains, leading 
to 10 to 20% reductions in corn, wheat, and soybean yields. 
In summary, the fall (1988)-winter-spring-summer (1989) drought acted initially to 
limit winter wheat planting by 12% in the winter (red) wheat belt. The drought conditions 
led to production reductions of 23% of average. This meant (assuming average yields of 
spring wheat in 1989) that the 1989 total U.S. wheat production would be decreased by 8% 
from that in 1988 (which itself was down 21% from average). The net effects of the 1988-89 
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drought were an ever deepening reduction of U.S. wheat stocks as set at 2.36 billion bushels 
on June 1, 1987; dropping to 1.85 billion bushels a year later (June 1, 1988); and dropping 
to only 549 million bushels by June 1, 1989. This will lead U.S. exports of wheat to decrease 
by 300 million bushels in the year beginning on June 1, 1989. Corn stocks continued to drop 
in 1989 as drought effects reduced yields below government expectations. 
Government policies relating to the 1989 drought problems (initially livestock and 
winter wheat farming; later corn and spring wheat) reflected continuing confusion over the 
use of direct relief versus use of crop insurance; debates over the formulation of a 1989 
Farm Relief Bill; and differences between Congress and the Administration in how and when 
to provide farm relief. 
A major factor affecting the management of agricultural and other resources, as well 
as policy development, was a continuing uncertainty over the drought's status and its effect, 
particularly in agriculture. From climatic measurements, the drought was present throughout 
the winter of 1988-89, spring of 1989, and summer of 1989 in large parts of the United 
States. Climatic probabilities issued in late 1988 indicated that large sectors of the United 
States would remain in drought throughout the spring and summer of 1989. Yet, some 
meteorologists proclaimed during mid-winter and late spring, that the drought was dissipating 
or would dissipate, and a tone of optimism reflected the policy of the Administration towards 
drought effects on summer crops. The lack of recognition of the drought problem is 
reflected in the continuing downgrading by the USDA of its corn production estimates: on 
March 1 they estimated U.S. production for 1989 as 7.85 billion bushels, this was dropped 
on July 1 to 7.45 billion, and then to 7.35 billion on August 1. Thus, grain surpluses 
expected at the end of 1989 were being predicted in mid-summer 1989 as much lower than 
had been forecast in the fall, winter, and spring of 1988-1989. 
Several environmental effects estimated or largely unknown from the 1988 drought 
became more evident during 1989. This included changes in populations of insect pests and 
damages to forests and tree crops. Water supply problems in the areas of deepening 
drought in the southwest continued to increase in 1989. Water hauling was common in 
several parts of Iowa as the water rationing in communities in parts of Missouri, Iowa, and 
Illinois. Above average western forest fires had emerged again in July and August 1989. 
Scientists who assessed, monitored, informed, and predicted the 1989 drought 
conditions continued to obfuscate the situation by their conflicting views. Certain 
prognosticators tended to be optimistic about 1989 drought conditions, whereas most other 
assessors were more pessimistic. The confusion resulting from the widely varying scientific 
views of the drought hindered decision making. 
85 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The objectives of this report, were three-fold. First, the impacts of the continuing 
drought of 1988-89 on the United States were to be measured. Then, the ensuing policy 
reactions and their implications for future U.S. policy were to be described. The final 
objective was to assess how these impacts and adjustments relate to the nation's existing 
climate services as well as assess how any on-going federal legislation affected this process. 
In achieving the third objective, I have drawn on the findings to develop recommendations 
for action related to climate aberrations. These recommendations call for actions that would 
enhance the nation's ability to more intelligently manage its natural resources and enhance 
its economy. 
The nation's five Regional Climate Centers (in the Northeast, Southeast, Midwest, 
High Plains, and Far West), the National Climate Data Center of NOAA, and the Climate 
Analysis Center of NOAA provided climate data and impacts information useful in the 
study. However, considerable information on the impacts and adjustments to the drought 
was gleaned from other sources. This points to the first recommendation: 
These climate centers, in concert with other federal and state agencies, need to 
develop better, more responsive procedures for interpreting climate impacts occurring in 
key sectors (water, agriculture, transportation, human health, and natural resources). 
Improvements will require research to develop and improve existing climate-impact 
relationships, and the development of an institutional infrastructure to focus on assessment 
of climate impacts to the environment and the economy. 
The evidence was strong that the atmospheric sciences community frequently 
provided federal, state, and local decision makers, as well as the general public, with 
conflicting assessments of the causes of the drought, the current condition of the drought, 
and the future of the drought. This led to confusion amongst the general public and 
detrimentally affected decision makers; delayed and often led to incorrect (or inefficient) 
reactions by impacted groups and business sectors; and limited wise policy development, 
particularly in the agricultural sector. This finding leads to a second recommendation. 
The federal government should establish a National Climate Service in NOAA, a 
system that a) ensures that climate data and information are quickly gathered, assessed for 
accuracy, interpreted as to possible impacts, and made widely available; and b) provides 
these national and regional results through national and regional climate centers acting as 
informational clearinghouses. 
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The National Climate Program Office, in concert with the Regional Climate Centers, 
the Climate Analysis Center, and the National Climatic Data Center, has attempted for two 
years to establish the above system and implement essential improvements in the climate 
impact assessment research, as part of the terms of the National Climate Program Act. 
These efforts have been frustrated by the lack of funding and attention to these matters 
within NOAA, and by the lack of interest by other federal agencies in addressing applied 
climate problems and improved services. This study of the 1988-89 drought revealed that 
adjustments in the federal level were greatly hampered by the lack of a standing interagency 
task force to assess the national impacts and provide policy guidance. Congress has 
proposed 1989 legislation, as part of the effort to establish a global change program, that 
if enacted would critically weaken the National Climate Program. This in turn would be 
counterproductive as the National Climate Program Office has been instrumental in urging 
improvements in the nation's climate services effort. Other proposed 1989 legislation would 
enhance the climate services for agriculture. As a result, the following recommendations are 
made: 
First, the federal government should establish a standing interagency committee 
under the National Climate Program that has the responsibilities for constantly monitoring 
climate aberrations affecting the United States; for informing agency leaders; and for 
ensuring that timely climate impact assessments (recommendation number one above) are 
performed. 
Second, the National Climate Program Act should be modified to embrace the 
actions needed to accomplish these tasks and the provisions of the proposed agricultural 
legislation (and all national services that are beyond the scope of a global change research 
program), and legislation that would alter and weaken the National Climate Program 
should be discouraged. 
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